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INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's decision in Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1' has been extensively analyzed as
the latest step in the Court's long struggle over the desegregation of public schools. Because the trend in recent years has been to emphasize the
importance of context in equal protection cases, and because school desegregation has tremendous social and historical importance, reaction to
Parents Involved has focused largely on its impact on desegregation efforts.2 Context, however, while important, is not everything. Just as
"[t]here is only one Equal Protection Clause,"' there is really only one
doctrinal structure for equal protection cases. Doctrinal shifts and innovations in one context carry over into others. The Parents Involved
decision was an important battle in a larger war over whether states may
strive for racial equality at all. The outcome of that struggle necessarily
affects whether the government can properly seek to ameliorate gender
hierarchy as well.

1. 551 U.S. 701 (2007). ParentsInvolved struck down voluntary plans for racial integration in school districts in Seattle and Louisville. In Louisville, the voluntary plan was
a continuation of court-ordered desegregation plans that had been in effect from
1975 until 2000. Id. at 715-16. Seattle had never been subjected to a desegregation
order but had begun voluntary measures in 1963 and expanded them in part to settle
desegregation lawsuits. Id. at 712; id. at 807-13 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

2.

See, e.g., Ronald Turner, The Voluntary School Integration Cases and the Contextual
Equal Protection Clause, 51 How. L.J. 251, 252 (2008) (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003) ("Context matters when reviewing race-based governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause.")); Leslie Yalof Garfield, The Glass Half
Full: Envisioningthe Future ofRace Preference Policies, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. Am. L.

385 (2008); Michael J. Kaufman, PICS in Focus: A Majority ofthe Supreme Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Race-Conscious School Integration Strategies, 35
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (2007); James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Voluntary
Integration, 121 HARv. L. REV. 131 (2007). But see Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The
ConstitutionalFuture of Race-NeutralEfforts to Achieve Diversity andAvoid Racial Isolation in Elementary and Secondary Schools, 50 B.C. L. REV. 277, 283 (2009) (noting

3.
4.

the potential effects of Parents Involved on "the full array of race-neutral government
action, including efforts in employment, the criminal justice arena, housing, and so
on"); Pamela S. Karlan, The Law of Small Numbers: Gonzales v. Carhart, Parents Involved in Community Schools, and Some Themes from the First Full Term of the
Roberts Court, 86 N.C. L. REv. 1369, 1387 (2008) ("Justice Kennedy in concurrence
seemed to be moving the doctrine governing race-conscious efforts at integrating
educational institutions towards other bodies of equal protection law.").
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
See generally Serena Mayeri, Reconstructingthe Race-Sex Analogy, 49 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 1789 (2008) (describing the ways in which race and sex cases have influenced
each other).
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This Article uses the term contingent equalprotection to describe the
constitutional analysis that applies to a range of governmental efforts to
ameliorate race and sex hierarchies. "Contingent" refers to the fact that
the equal protection analysis is contingent upon the existence of structural, de facto inequality. Contingent equal protection cases include
those that involve explicit race and sex classifications, facially neutral
efforts to reduce inequality, and accommodation of sex differences to
promote equality. Uniting all three kinds of cases under a single conceptual umbrella reveals the implications that developments in one area can
have for the other two.
Despite the state action doctrine, which prevents courts from insiststates redress inequality,' the Supreme Court has usually allowed
that
ing
states to redress structural inequality if they choose to do so. The term
structuralinequality is broad and is in a rough sense the inverse of the
state action doctrine. That is, structuralinequality refers to existing conditions of inequality that are not directly attributable to a specific past
act of governmental discrimination that would give rise to a right to
race-conscious relief under the Equal Protection Clause. It includes "the
institutional defaults, established structures, and social or political
norms that may appear to be ... neutral, non-individual focused, and
otherwise rational, but that taken together create and reinforce" segregation and inequality.
Whether the government has a compelling interest in eliminating
structural inequality was a key issue that divided the Court in Parents
Involved.7 In contingent equal protection cases, the state interest in
5.

6.

The Supreme Court tried to synthesize the state action doctrine in Edmonson v. Leesvile Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 615 (1991). According to that opinion, state action
exists when (1) the claimed deprivation results from the exercise of a right or privilege
having its source in state authority and (2) the defendant can be described in all fairness as a state actor. Id. at 620. Relevant to the latter question are the extent of
reliance on governmental assistance, the performance of traditional governmental
functions, and any unique aggravation of the injury by the incidents of governmental
authority. Id. at 621-22.
Erica Frankenberg & Chinh

Q. Le,

The Post-ParentsInvolved Challenge: Confronting

ExtralegalObstacles to Integration, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1015, 1016 (2008) (defining the
"now well-accepted phenomenon of 'structural inequality' or 'structural racism' as
theorized by Andrew Grant-Thomas & john a. powell, StructuralRacism and Color
Lines in The United States, in TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY COLOR LINES: MULTIRACIAL
CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (Andrew Grant-Thomas & Gary Orfield eds.,
Temple University Press) (2008), and Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of

Race: Political Geography in LegalAnalysis, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1843 (1994)); see also
john a. powell, StructuralRacism: Building Upon the Insights ofJohn Calmore, 86 N.C.
7.

L. REv. 791 (2008).
See Parents Involved in Cmry. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 72533 (plurality opinion) (discussing the state interests); id. at 787-90 (Kennedy, J.,
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equality can suspend otherwise-applicable doctrine that would condemn
race- or sex-conscious policies. The modifier "contingent" reflects the
fact that the suspension of otherwise-applicable rules lasts only so long
as the Court acknowledges the continuing existence of inequality. Contingent equal protection is thus the last vestige of the anti-subordination
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, an interpretation the Supreme Court has largely declined to enforce but has at least permitted
Congress and the states to pursue.' Because contingent equal protection
is still possible, the Court has not (yet) constitutionalized the status quo
by forbidding race-conscious or sex-conscious state action intended to
promote equality.
The "yet" is important. Contingent equal protection is under attack-and with it, the state's ability to pursue the Fourteenth
Amendment's anti-subordination agenda. In ParentsInvolved, the Court
came within one vote of holding that there is no compelling state interest in ameliorating defacto racial segregation. Such a holding, combined
with aggressive application of disparate impact doctrine, would effectively forbid states or the federal government from adopting policies
designed to reduce segregation and structural race inequality. Two years
after Parents Involved, Justice Scalia played out this line of reasoning in
his concurrence in Ricci v. DeStefano,9 where he argued that the disparate
impact provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196410 are unconstitutional." Because contingent equal protection also flourishes in
sex classification cases, its elimination would threaten measures such as
the Pregnancy Discrimination Actl2 and Family and Medical Leave
Act," which are designed to promote sex equality.
This threat to remedial legislation exploits a point of confusion in
equal protection doctrine. Part I of this Article introduces the framework of contingent equal protection and shows how it has operated in
cases involving racial classifications. It shows that the Supreme Court
has implicitly recognized the compelling state interest in counteracting
structural inequality. Cases that appear to suggest the contrary are in fact
based on the Court's aversion to government-sponsored racial classifica-

8.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (explaining why he did not join
the plurality's discussion of the state interests).
See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the EqualProtection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107
(1976) (setting out the now-classic distinction between the anti-classification and
anti-subordination interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause).
129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006).
See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2681-83 (Scalia, J., concurring).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006).
29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (2006).
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tions of individuals. Part II extends the concept of contingent equal protection to encompass sex equality cases, including the cases known as
the "real differences" cases, in which the Court sees not inequality but
natural sex differences. In this context, the Court is not averse to classifications per se. The sex cases thus demonstrate that the problem in
equal protection doctrine is not whether structural inequality is a compelling state interest-it is-but what means that states can use to
pursue that interest. The attempts by the Parents Involved plurality and
by Justice Scalia in Ricci to deny the state interest in combating structural inequality are thus contrary to precedent as well as to the antisubordination function of the Fourteenth Amendment itself.
Part III extends some of the insights generated by analyzing the
race and sex cases together through the framework of contingent equal
protection. Part III.A sketches the implications that the ParentsInvolved
plurality approach would have for the range of cases that fall under the
rubric of contingent equal protection, starkly limiting the state's ability
to ameliorate inequality and effectively constitutionalizing the status
quo. Part III.B suggests the possibilities of an alternative path, using
contingent equal protection to define the scope of Congress's power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and to support a positive right to
substantive equality in some contexts.
I.

CONTINGENT EQUAL PROTECTION AND RACIAL INEQUALITY

In ParentsInvolved, five members of the Supreme Court recognized,
in separate opinions, that the amelioration of structural inequality is a
compelling state interest in at least some contexts." The four Justices in
the plurality concluded the opposite." The plurality's view would effectively constitutionalize the status quo of inequality by prohibiting the
6
state from acting with a conscious purpose to redress it.'
14. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 505 U.S. 701, 803
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 787-88, 797-98 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
15. See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text (discussing the plurality opinion).
16. A legal rule "constitutionalizes" the status quo when it treats existing circumstances as
both natural and constitutionally immune from legislative modification. This idea
derives from the perception that the early twentieth-century Supreme Court constitutionalized "Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,
71 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see Jeffrey M. Shaman, On the 100th Anniversary
ofLochner v. New York, 72 TENN. L. REV. 455, 490 (2005) ("By constitutionalizing
common law categories and natural law concepts, the Court froze the status quo,
blocking the way for legislation that altered the orthodox relationship of employer
and employee."). When the Court treats existing hierarchies based on race and gender
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Perhaps surprisingly, the plurality's view follows fairly naturally
from the Court's recent precedent on racial classifications. Justice Kennedy, despite having joined the majority opinions in most of those prior
cases, balked at the next step in ParentsInvolved.17 His separate concurrence indicated how he would create a stopping point in the Court's
march away from contingent equal protection, towards absolute constitutional colorblindness that would prevent government from even
aspiring to racial equality.
This Part explains how equal protection doctrine arrived at a point
where a plurality of the Supreme Court could plausibly repudiate the
compelling state interest in equality. It also evaluates Justice Kennedy's
stopping point. Part L.A describes the corner into which the Court has
painted itself, with contingent equal protection on one side and disparate impact doctrine on the other. Disparate impact doctrine generally
forbids even race-neutral government action intended to have a racially
disparate effect. To survive equal protection review, such action needs
to be supported by a compelling state interest." Justice Kennedy and
others have suggested that race-neutral policies meant to promote racial
equality could somehow avoid strict scrutiny entirely.20 Part L.A concludes that such a strategy is neither a plausible doctrinal development
nor necessarily desirable. The better route is to recognize the state's
compelling interest in reducing structural inequality and to evaluate it
using the developing form of strict scrutiny that is not fatal in fact.

17.
18.
19.
20.

as natural and attempts to alter them as unconstitutional race or sex classifications, it
constitutionalizes those hierarchies. See Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Inaction, 50
How. L.J. 611, 636 (2007) ("[B]y reading the Constitution to require prospective
neutrality in the vast majority of future allocation programs, the Court precludes political actors from adopting strategies that might eventually equalize the allocation of
resources. In short, the Supreme Court has constitutionalized existing racial inequalities, and it has done so in the name of promoting equality."); Martha Minow, The
Supreme Court 1986 Term, Forward: Justice Engendered, 101 HARv. L. REv. 10,
54-55 (explaining the implicit assumption that the status quo is neutral, so that governmental actions to change it "have a different status than omissions," and quoting
Aviam Soifer, Complacency and Constitutional Law, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 383, 409
(1981) ("To settle for the constitutionalization of the status quo is to bequeath a petrified forest.")).
See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 787-90 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (rejecting this aspect of the majority opinion).
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245 (1976), discussed infia notes 33-41 and
accompanying text.
See infra note 41.
See ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 789 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment); id. at 837 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See also Robinson, supra note 2,
at 297-311; Kathleen M. Sullivan, After Affirmative Action, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1039,
1048-49, 1054 (1998).
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Part I.B discusses the implicit prerequisite for that strict scrutiny
analysis: the compelling state interest in eliminating structural inequality. Affirmative action cases have traditionally rejected a state interest in
remedies for "societal discrimination." 2 1 Part .B argues, however, that
the Supreme Court has implicitly recognized an interest in promoting
equality, although pursuit of that interest is limited by the Court's aversion to racial classifications of individuals.
A. StructuralInequality and FaciallyNeutralState Action
When the Supreme Court strikes down a benign or remedial racial
classification such as an affirmative action program, it often holds out
22
the alternative of race-neutral strategies for meeting the state's goals.
Facially neutral polices that are designed to increase racial diversity are
24
sometimes called race-neutralaffirmative action23 or "alternative action.
These strategies raise their own set of constitutional questions. Kim
Forde-Mazrui first pointed out that race-neutral affirmative action plans

21. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (Powell, J.,
announcing judgment); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 220
(1995).
22. See, e.g., Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 789 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (proposing site selection, design of attendance zones,
resource allocation, and recruitment of faculty and students). Race-neutral methods
are not necessarily available or effective to integrate many school districts. See also
Derek W. Black, The Uncertain Future of School Desegregation and the Importance of
Goodwill Good Sense, and a Misguided Decision, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 947, 980-82
(2008) (explaining why race-neutral measures such as site selection will not achieve
integration and stating that Justice Kennedy's suggestion that they could "underestimates reality"); Ryan, supra note 2 at 138-39, 144-49 (assessing the impact of and
remaining alternatives after Parents Involved and noting, for example, that much existing segregation is between rather than within school districts). But see Robinson,
supra note 2, at 336-45 (canvassing race-neutral alternatives and suggesting they
could be somewhat effective); JEFFERSON COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, No
RETREAT: THE JCPS COMMITMENT TO SCHOOL INTEGRATION (2008), http://
www.jefferson.kl2.ky.us/Pubs/NoRetreatBro.pdf (summarizing Louisville's new student assignment plan and describing the community as "resolved and united in its
desire to integrate our schools without using an individual student's race"). See also
Daniel Kiel, AcceptingJustice Kennedy's Dare: The Future ofIntegration in a Post-PICS
World, 102 FoRDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (evaluating Parents Involved and
Louisville's new plan).
23. See Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative
Action, 88 GEORGETOWN L.J. 2331, 2335 (2000).
24. Id. at 2332 (citing World News Tonight: Colleges Seek Alternative to Affirmative Action
Keeping Minority Enrollment Numhers Up (ABC television broadcast, May 20,
1998)).
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would be vulnerable under the Court's disparate impact doctrine,2 5
which prohibits facially neutral state action that is merely a mask for a
racial classification or motive.26 The equal protection landscape has
changed somewhat since Forde-Mazrui first identified this problem, but
if the "reactionary colorblindness"2 7 of the Parents Involved plurality
prevails, even race-neutral affirmative action could be found unconstitutional.
1. Race-Neutral Affirmative Action
As the federal courts and many states have restricted the use of
traditional affirmative action, institutions have turned to alternative,
race-neutral means for increasing diversity and providing equal opportunities. One well-known example of race-neutral affirmative action is
the Texas Ten Percent Plan, which guarantees admission to any public
college for students in the top ten percent of any Texas high school's
graduating class.28 At the K-12 level, school districts have experimented
with income-based instead of race-based busing.2 9 Schools, employers,
and governments bidding out contracts have expanded recruitment efforts to target minority applicants.30 These programs-many of which
have always been important parts of affirmative action-seek to amelio25. Forde-Mazrui, supranote 23, at 2346-47.
26. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that disparate impact in the
absence of discriminatory motive does not violate the Equal Protection Clause); Pers.
Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (clarifying the high standard for intent under the doctrine); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252 (1977) (setting out the framework for disparate impact claims, discussed infra).
27. See Ian F. Haney L6pez, 'A Nation of Minorities Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary

Colorblindness,59 STAN. L. REV. 985 (2007) (describing and analyzing the development of the ideology that the author terms "reactionary colorblindness").
28. TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803(a) (Vernon 2007). The Texas plan was adopted in
response to the Fifth Circuit's pre-Grutterdecision that affirmative action was unconstitutional. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 962 (5th Cit. 1996).
29. See Evan Osnos, Schools Find New Route to Diversity- New Integration Plans Use In-

come to Place Pupils, CHI. TIUB. Jan. 28, 2002, at N7; see also Lauren E. Winters,
Colorblind Context: Redefining Race-Conscious Policies in Primary and Secondary Edu-

cation, 86 ORE. L. REV. 679 (2007) (arguing that school districts should use
socioeconomic status to assign students to schools).
30. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, UnderstandingAffirmative Action, 23 HASTINGS
CONsT. L.Q. 921, 929-32 (1996) (describing self-study, outreach, and counseling as

methods for increasing diversity in schools and workplaces); Michelle Adams, The
Last Wave ofAffirmative Action, 1998 Wisc. L. REv. 1395, 1401-07 (1998) (describ-

ing a range of facially neutral but race-conscious measures to increase diversity in
government programs, businesses, and schools).
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rate racial inequality and defacto segregation without facially classifying
individuals by race."
The purpose of race-neutral affirmative action is to ameliorate de
facto segregation and structural inequality. Although these measures are
facially race-neutral, they are adopted with the hope that they will lead
to greater racial diversity within institutions and equality across society.
The purpose is thus to combat structural inequality.
2. Disparate Impact Doctrine and the Challenge to
Race-Neutral Affirmative Action
To describe a state policy as designed to eliminate structural inequality is to suggest that it is manifestly consistent with the Fourteenth
Amendment. Race-neutral affirmative action, however, can also be characterized as a facially neutral policy that has been adopted because of its
racial impact.3 2 The latter characterization suggests that the policy is
vulnerable under the Washington v. Davis" line of cases that established
disparate impact doctrine under the Equal Protection Clause.
In Washington v. Davis, African American applicants to the District
of Columbia police department challenged "Test 21," the employmentqualifications exam used by the police department to rank applicants.
They demonstrated that the test had a racially disparate impact: white
applicants scored better than black applicants at a statistically significant
rate." The test had not been shown to predict job performance.3 5 The
Supreme Court announced that the district's indifference to this
31. Whether the plans are effective for this purpose or are unacceptable for other reasons
remains open. See, e.g., Marta Tienda & Sunny Xinchun Niu, Capitalizingon Segregation, PretendingNeutrality: College Admissions and the Texas Top 10% Law, 8 Am.
L. & EcoN. REv. 312 (2006) (finding that the Texas plan facilitated some minority
enrollment in selective institutions but failed to sustain minority admissions rates at
the flagship schools); see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 303 n.10 (2003)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (pointing out that percentage plans depend on continued
segregation in K-12 schools and encourage students to stay in low-performing schools
or "Constitutional
and take easy courses); Robert J. Delahunty, "ConstitutionalJustice"
Peace'? The Supreme Court andAffirmative Action, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 11, 3741 (2008) (arguing that affirmative action is itself a conservative, privilege-preserving
response to racial inequality).
32. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2682 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring)
("Tide VII's disparate-impact provisions place a racial thumb on the scales, often requiring employers to evaluate the racial outcomes of their policies, and to make
decisions based on (because of) those racial outcomes.").
33. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
34. Davis, 426 U.S. at 235.
35. Davis, 426 U.S. at 235.
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disparate impact did not constitute a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. Instead, the plaintiffs could prevail only by showing that the
police department had a discriminatory racial purpose when it adopted
Test 21.
As the doctrine later developed in Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation,8 even proof of a discriminatory purpose is not necessarily enough to invalidate state action.
The plaintiff's proof that a discriminatory purpose was a "motivating
factor" in the adoption of Test 21 would merely shift the burden of
proof to the state.39 The police department could still prevail if it could
prove that it would have adopted Test 21 anyway, for legitimate reasons,
regardless of any discriminatory motive that was also present.40 In other
words, the state can prevail by refuting causation. Only once a racial
motive and causation are established is the state's action subjected to
*
*
41
strict scrutiny.
36. Davis, 426 U.S. at 241-42 (discussing the required showing of discriminatory purpose); see also Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)
(explaining that "discriminatory purpose" under Davis "implies more than intent as
volition or intent as awareness of consequences").
37. Davis, 426 U.S. at 245.

38. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
39. Vill. ofArlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 270 n.21. The weight of this burden is demonstrated by PersonnelAdministrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979),
which rejected a sex discrimination challenge to a veterans' preference in state hiring.
The state had obviously known that the preference would benefit a class that was
overwhelmingly male. Moreover, the state had taken that disparity into account by
creating an exception for jobs that particularly "call for" women. Id. at 270 n.22. But,
because the state did not adopt the statute in order to harm women, there was no violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 279 ("'Discriminatory purpose,'
however, implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences.
It implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an
identifiable group.").
40. Vill. ofArlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 270 n.21.
41. If the state fails to justify its policy under the Arlington Heights analysis, the Court's
precedents are unclear about what happens next. Does the policy fail equal protection
analysis automatically, or is it subject to strict scrutiny? This point remains unclear
because in most cases, either there is no racial motive or it is one that obviously
would not pass strict scrutiny. At times, the Court has suggested that the disparate
impact analysis is wholly separate from strict scrutiny review. See, e.g., Washington v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 484-85 n.28 (1982) (referring to strict scrutiny as the standard applicable to "explicit racial classifications" and as distinct from
disparate impact analysis). However, in the voting rights and redistricting context,
where the government frequently has a benign, remedial racial motive, the Court applies strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993) (holding that
strict scrutiny applies to a redistricting plan that intentionally assigns voters to voting
districts on the basis of race). The ambiguity in other contexts should be resolved by
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Suppose that, having proven its point that it was not guilty of intentional race discrimination, the D.C. police department nonetheless
regrets that its hiring practices result in a disproportionately white police
force. It hires a consultant to design a "Test 22," which must meet two
requirements: first, the test must identify applicants likely to be good
police officers as well as or better than Test 21; second, results on Test 22
must not have a disparate racial impact. The latter requirement means
that African American applicants must do comparatively better, and
white applicants comparatively worse, on Test 22 than on Test 21. The
consultant succeeds in producing a Test 22, and the department adopts
it.

The department is now vulnerable to an equal protection claim by
disappointed white applicants, using the doctrine of Washington v. Davis
and Arlington Heights. Its action-replacing Test 21 with Test 22-will
have a negative, disparate impact on white applicants, as compared to
the status quo ante. The fact that the claim is one of "reverse" discrimi42
nation does not alter the analysis under the Equal Protection Clause.
The plaintiffs can easily prove that the racial effect was a motivating factor;4 3 indeed, it was the motive for developing the new test. For that
reason the police department will not be able to make out the affirmative defense that it would have adopted Test 22 for reasons other than
changing the racial makeup of its force. To preserve Test 22, the police
clearly incorporating strict scrutiny as the last step of the disparate impact analysis.
Otherwise, proof of a racial motive will doom state policy even where the motive is
benign, compelling, and consistent with the anti-subordination goals of the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead of stopping with the Arlington Heights analysis, the
Court should at least give race-neutral alternative action plans the opportunity to satisfy strict scrutiny. Prior cases dealing with facially neutral state action, e.g.,
Washington v. Davis, assumed that if there was an underlying racial motive, that motive was necessarily pernicious. The disparate impact doctrine was designed to screen
out cases where there was no underlying racial intent. But the Court has never revisited its disparate impact doctrine in a case involving an effort to eliminate rather
than perpetuate subordination. Where the government is not hidingits racial motive,
it should at least be given the opportunity to satisfy strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny
analysis should therefore be added as a fourth step in the Davis/Arlington Heights
analysis in all cases, as has already been done in the redistricting cases.
42. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (applying strict scrutiny to
an affirmative action program in higher education); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to a minority set-aside program for federal contracting). See also infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text
(discussing the appropriate level of scrutiny).
43. See Vill ofArlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 264-68 (discussing the "motivating factor"
requirement).
44. See Vill. ofArlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 270 n.21 (setting out the affirmative defense).
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department must show that it had a compelling state interest in a test
designed to produce racial parity in results.
The Supreme Court nearly confronted this scenario in Ricci v. DeStefano, in which the city of New Haven had rejected the results of a
promotion exam because of a racially disparate impact." Two differences
prevented Ricci from presenting a head-on conflict between the city's
effort to reduce structural inequality" and the Court's adherence to colorblindness as the dominant theory of equal protection: First, the
Court was able to decide Ricci under Title VII, avoiding constitutional
questions. Second, New Haven had thrown out its own "Test 21" after
administering it to candidates and was sued before it had a chance to
develop a "Test 22."" The majority opinion-written by Justice Kennedy and joined by the Parents Involved plurality-concluded that this
sequence of events made the city's actions tantamount to an express racial classification of the individual test-takers. 9 The city's action was
prompted by the known races of the particular people who had passed
and failed the test.o Justice Kennedy, manifesting the same aversion to
such classifications that he expressed in Parents Involved," interpreted
Title VII to forbid the city to act on that basis.52
Because of the unusual timing in Ricci, the decision does not preclude New Haven from finding a Test 22 for future use." The opinion,

45. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009).
46. The dissent in Ricci described several reasons why the test results could reasonably be
viewed as a manifestation of structural inequality. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2690-91,
2693-94 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
47. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2664-65. Nonetheless, the Court's discussion of Title VII
disparate impact doctrine has some clear (and some not-so-clear) implications for its
likely equal protection analysis. See Richard Primus, The Future of DisparateImpact,
108 MICH. L. REv. (forthcoming 2010) (analyzing the ways in which Ricci sounded
in equal protection at least as much as in Title VII disparate impact doctrine).
48. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2664.
49. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2673-74.
50. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2673-74.
51. See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
52. The Court held that, under Title VII, an employer may use a racial classification as a
remedy for a racially disparate impact only if there is a "strong basis in evidence" for
believing that the employer could be found liable under Title VII's disparate impact
provision. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2664. For such a basis to exist, there must be not
only a statistically significant disparate impact but also an evidentiary basis for believing that the employer could not succeed in a "business necessity" defense. See id. at
2678.
53. A few months after Ricci was decided, one of the African American firefighters filed a
disparate impact lawsuit demanding, inter alia, adoption of a "Test 22." Briscoe v.
City of New Haven, Docket No. 3:09, CV-01642-CSH (D. Conn., Oct. 15, 2009).
Among other interesting issues that may be raised in that case is the effect of the pe-
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however, offers scant assurance that such action will be upheld. The majority offered bland assurance that employers have an unquestioned
ability to "ensure that all groups have a fair opportunity to apply for
promotions."1 Conspicuously absent is any indication that an employer
may treat a racially disparate impact as presumptive evidence of unfairness. The majority also expressly reserved the question whether the
disparate impact rules in Title VII violate the Equal Protection Clause
by requiring employers to take race into account."
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia sent up a trial balloon on
striking down Title VII's disparate impact rules. Unlike the Equal Protection Clause, Tide VII prohibits facially neutral policies that have
unintentional but also unnecessary disparate impacts on the basis of race
or sex.17 After diplomatically calling the question "not an easy one," Justice Scalia laid out the case for striking down that part of Title VII." He
characterized race-neutral affirmative action as "[i]ntentional discrimination . . ., just one step up the chain.""
The same reasoning can be applied in the context of higher education. For example, Justice Thomas's dissent in Grutter v, Bollinger argued
nultimate paragraph of Ricci, in which the Court tried to foreclose such a suit but
badly muffed it:
Our holding today clarifies how Title VII applies to resolve competing expectations under the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact
provisions. If, after it certifies the test results, the City faces a disparateimpact suit, then in light of our holding today it should be clear that the
City would avoid disparate-impact liability based on the strong basis in
evidence that, had it not certified the results, it would have been subject to
disparate-treatment liability.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2681. The Court here appears to confuse the summary judgment
standard with the strong-basis-in-evidence standard that it had just adopted for justifying disparate impact remedies. If there were merely a "strong basis in evidence" for
disparate treatment, then presumably the Court would not have granted summary
judgment to the plaintiffs on that claim. The Court also improperly treats its own
factual findings as if they were fixed truths rather than the product of the parties' litigation strategies and the various burdens of proof. The Court appears oblivious to the
fact that a future disparate impact plaintiff, like Mr. Briscoe, would not be bound by
the result or the evidentiary record of Ricci. See also Primus, supra note 47 (arguing
that one plausible reading of Ricci is an institutional reading under which courts
would have broader authority to impose disparate impact remedies than an employer
may adopt on its own). As of this writing, the City of New Haven has moved to stay
Briscoe until promotion decisions are made in light of Ricci.
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677.
See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2676.
See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2681-83 (Scalia, J., concurring).
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006).
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2681-83 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2682.
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that the University of Michigan Law School should have pursued other
means for achieving diversity, rather than classifying its applicants on
the basis of race.60 He ridiculed the state interest in affirmative action as
an interest in retaining admissions criteria that have a disparate impact
on minority applicants.6 ' If the school was unhappy that its admissions
criteria produced a racially homogenous class, argued Justice Thomas, it
could use different criteria.62 If the law school followed Justice Thomas's
advice, however, it would adopt new admissions criteria consciously
chosen because of their ability to produce a class with different racial
makeup than the current system achieves. The new admissions system
would be another Test 22, and the law school would be in the same position: vulnerable to an equal protection challenge from disappointed
white applicants.3 The evidence from ParentsInvolved and Ricci is that a
plurality, perhaps a majority, of the current Court, including Justice
Thomas, would deem that challenge well-founded.
If the Court were to rule against Test 22, it would effectively constitutionalize the status quo of racial inequality, forbidding conscious state
action to redress it. Possibly, in some contexts, the government could
convincingly argue that it would have adopted the remedial measure
regardless of the racial effect. For example, schools using economic integration could truthfully argue that the public controversy over racial
integration and affirmative action brought their attention to the need
for greater economic integration. Although they hoped that greater ra60. 539 U.S. 306, 368-69 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (referring to current percentage plans in Texas, California, and Florida and their similarity to nineteenth century
certification systems).
61. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 370 ("The Law School's continued adherence to measures it
knows produce racially skewed results is not entitled to deference by this Court."). In
this regard, Justice Thomas's dissent is more radical and would require a deeper
commitment to equality than the majority's approach. Cf Delahunty, supra note 31,
at 37, 41 (arguing that affirmative action is a conservative, elite-protecting response
to inequality and noting that it was promoted by the Nixon Administration as the
minimal available response to demands for racial justice).
62. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 370 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("An infinite variety of admissions methods are available to the Law School.").
63. This challenge has already been set out in Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Can Michigan Universities Use Proxiesfr Race After the Ban on Racial Preferences?, 13 MICH. J. OF RACE &
L. 277 (2007), and Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Strict Scrutiny ofFacially Race-NeutralState
Action and the Texas Ten Percent Plan, 53 BAYLOR L. REv. 289 (2001). As indicated
in both these articles, the argument that alternative action is invalid may have particular force in states that have adopted statutory bans on racial preferences if those
statutes are construed not to leave any leeway for measures that satisfy strict scrutiny.
But see Chris Chambers Goodman, Examining "Voter Intent" Behind Proposition209:
Why Recruitment, Retention, and Scholarship Privileges Should Be Permissible UnderArticle I, Section 31, 27 CHICANA/O-LATINA/O L. REV. 59 (2008) (making a contrary
argument in the context of California's ban on racial preferences).
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cial diversity would also result from economic diversity, the latter alone
was sufficient reason for action. If so, the policy would be saved under
the third step of the Arlington Heights doctrine, which allows a law to
stand despite its racial motive if there was an adequate, raceindependent reason for the policy.6 But race-neutral policies adopted
predominantly out of a desire for racial integration would be subject to
strict scrutiny.
3. The State Interest in Race-Neutral Affirmative Action
In order to pass strict scrutiny, a race-neutral affirmative action program needs a compelling state interest. That state interest will usually be
the desire to reduce segregation and structural inequality. In Parents
Involved, the plurality insisted that integration and equality were not
66
compelling, and perhaps not even legitimate, state interests. Providing
the fifth vote to decide the case, Justice Kennedy focused instead on the
means the school districts had employed. Justice Kennedy did, however,
express his clear desire to uphold race-neutral policies for promoting
equal opportunity. 7 Because the constraints of disparate impact doctrine
apply to race-neutral policies, that outcome depends on recognizing a
compelling state interest in the elimination of structural inequality.
The plurality opinion analyzed the school districts' integration
plans under the usual two-step strict scrutiny framework. The first step
64. Like the school districts in ParentsInvolved, some commentators have tried to re-state
the state interest at the core of affirmative action and integration plans so that it does
not look like a racial classification. See, e.g., Daria Roithmayr, DirectMeasures: An Alternative Form ofAffirmative Action, 7 MICH. J. OF RACE & L. 1 (2001) (arguing that
schools could replace traditional affirmative action plans with admissions criteria that,
for example, favor applicants who have been the victims of race discrimination); Michael J. Kaufman, (Still) Constitutional De-Segregation Strategies: Teaching Racial
Literacy to Secondary Students and Preferencing Racially-LiterateApplicants to Higher
Education, 13 MIcH. J. OF RACE & L. 147 (2007) (arguing that race-based school assignments could be justified by the need to teach racial literacy, and that universities
could prefer applicants who are racially literate). These efforts seem unlikely to survive the intent inquiry in the disparate impact analysis unless the Court embraces a
state interest in equality.
65. The diversity rationale recognized in Grutter is insufficient because it does not allow
the government to focus particularly on race. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 722-24 (2007).
66. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 725-33 (plurality opinion) (equating all of the
school district's claimed interests with "racial balancing" for its own sake); id. at 751
(Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]he school districts lack an interest in preventing resegregation.").
67. See ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 788-89 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
68. See ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 720 (plurality opinion).
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is to identify the state interests and determine whether they are compelling. 9 The second step is to ask whether the means chosen are narrowly
tailored to serve those compelling state interests. 70 The plurality concluded that the school districts had no compelling state interest in
racially integrated schools. Unlike universities, grade schools do not
generally choose their student bodies. They do not make conscious efforts to achieve the holistic, multi-faceted diversity that was extolled in
Grutter v. Bollinger. Because in truth only racial diversity was at stake in
Parents Involved, the plurality had an easy time using Grutter to condemn the state interest.72 If the plurality had prevailed in condemning
the integration plans at this first, state-interest phase of the analysis, it
would have set the stage for constitutional challenges to all race-neutral
efforts to achieve racial integration or ameliorate racial inequality.
The import of the plurality's analysis was clear-and its adoption
by four members of the Court surprising-in light of the attention this
issue received at oral argument. Several justices asked the parties' lawyers
and the Solicitor General about the status of facially neutral policies
adopted out of a desire for racial diversity in the schools. Justice Kennedy posed the hypothetical of a school district deciding where to build
a new school. In light of existing segregation in housing, one location
would result in a racially diverse school, while the other would contribute to the de facto segregation of the schools. Could the school district
choose the former, because it wants racial diversity?75 Counsel for the
plaintiffs said that it could not, because any race-related motive for state
action is forbidden.7 ' But even the Solicitor General, who appeared in
support of the plaintiffs, distanced himself from that position. Justice

69.
70.
71.
72.

73.

74.
75.
76.
77.

See ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 720 (plurality opinion).
See ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 720 (plurality opinion).
ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 725-733 (plurality opinion).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 729 (plurality opinion). For discussions of the differences between the goals of racial integration
and the diversity goals the Court sanctioned in Grutter, see Black, supra note 22, at
969 (arguing that Justice Kennedy's opinion in Parents Involved confused desegregation with diversity); Kenneth B. Nunn, Diversity as a Dead-End, 35 PEPP. L. REV.
705, 731 (2008) (describing diversity as "victor's justice").
E.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 4-5, ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. 701 (No. 05908) (Kennedy, J.) (site selection); id. at 6 (Scalia, J.) (magnet schools); id. at 18
(Roberts, J.) (sites and magnet schools); id. at 19 (Kennedy, J.) (site selection).
Id. at 4-5, ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. 701 (No. 05-908).
Id. at 4-5, ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. 701 (No. 05-908).
Id. at 5, 7, ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. 701 (No. 05-908).
Id. at 18, Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701 (No. 05-908) (indicating that Davis and
Arlington Heights would apply); id. at 21 (stating that there is nothing unconstitutional about "desiring a mingling of the races and establishing policies which achieve
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Scalia, too, was at pains to demonstrate that the legitimacy of a
race-conscious goal was distinct from the permissibility of racial classifications as the means to reach that goal." Nonetheless, Justice Scalia
joined the plurality opinion that would have struck down the districts'
integration plans on the grounds that racial integration was not a
compelling state interest. Justice Scalia went even further in his Ricci
concurrence, making the case that attempting to rectify disparate impacts generally is unconstitutional.o Both of those opinions contradict
what appeared to be Justice Scalia's position at oral argument in Parents
Involved."' They also contradict Justice Thomas's Grutter dissent, which
proposed exactly the kind of race-neutral but race-conscious strategies
that the ParentsInvolved plurality would reject.8 2
Justice Kennedy's separate concurrence in ParentsInvolved served to
explain his disagreement with the majority on this point. His concurrence not only endorsed the state interest in integration but also
suggested that race-neutral integration strategies might be exempt from
strict scrutiny. Commentators have also suggested that benign racial
84
policies that are facially neutral should receive a lower level of review.
While consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment's anti-subordination
goals, adoption of this approach would have to surmount several hurdles. The Court struggled a long time before settling on strict scrutiny
for benign racial classifications. Consistency would seem to require
either overruling that result or applying the same rule in disparate

78.
79.
80.
81.

82.
83.
84.
85.

that result but which do not single out individuals and disqualify them for certain
things because of their race"); id. at 23.
Id. at 27-29, ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. 701 (No. 05-908).
See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 725-33 (plurality opinion).
See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681-83 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Compare Transcript of Oral Argument at 27-29, Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701 (No.
05-908) (Justice Scalia distinguishing race-conscious goals from racial classification as
a means) with Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 725-33 (rejecting race-conscious goals as
non-compelling).
See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Thomas's Grurter
dissent).
See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 789 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 2; Sullivan, supra note 20, at 1048-49.
See ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 741-42 (plurality opinion) (describing the history of
the Court's consideration of this issue). The application of this rule to federal action
is on shakier ground. See Eric J. Segall, ReconceptualizingjudicialActivism asjudicial
Responsibility: A Tale of Two Justice Kennedys, 41 ARiz. ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2009)
(demonstrating that the application of this rule to federal action was accomplished
through intellectual dishonesty by the Supreme Court).
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86

impact cases. Indeed, because the racial effects of a facially neutral policy might not be immediately apparent, heightened review might be
particularly warranted. Moreover, Grutter showed that strict scrutiny
need not be fatal. Insofar as the Court appears to be moving away from,
or at least compressing, its rigid tiers of scrutiny, the most natural development for disparate impact doctrine would be to apply Grutter's
moderated strict scrutiny while recognizing the state's compelling interest in eliminating structural inequality."
Equal protection doctrine ordinarily requires the government to
treat similarly situated individuals alike. Contingent equal protection
recognizes that groups of people may not be similarly situated, not because of anything inherent in the individuals themselves but because of
existing conditions of group-based, structural inequality. Recognizing
this inequality-and the state's compelling interest in combating itallows the government to pursue a race-conscious goal without running
afoul of the Equal Protection Clause as long as the means used are narrowly tailored.
B. StructuralInequality and Racial Classifications
In affirmative action cases, the Supreme Court has rejected the
state's interest in providing a remedy for mere "societal discrimination"
as not sufficiently compelling to satisfy strict scrutiny." That rejection,
however, should not be allowed to obscure the important role that the
state interest in racial equality has played in more recent decisions.
This Article refers to the state interest in reducing structural inequality rather than the interest in giving a remedy for societal
discrimination.This change in vocabulary implies not an entirely different set of social facts but a more precise understanding of those facts and
a different perspective. The Court first seriously discussed this sort of
86. See Karlan, supra note 2, at 1387-90 (noting that Kennedy's proposal on this point
"would completely transform existing equal protection doctrine" and "simply cannot
be right"); see also Forde-Mazrui, supra note 23, at 2337 ("Only arguments that take
existing doctrine seriously can provide public universities and other state actors with a
good-faith basis for adopting race-neutral affirmative action policies and the courts
with a judicially principled basis upon which to uphold them.").
87. For discussion of this apparent trend in equal protection doctrine, see Andrew M.
Siegel, Equal Protection Unmodified: JusticeJohn PaulStevens and the Casefor Unmediated ConstitutionalInterpretation, 74 FoRDHAM L. REV. 2339 (2006); Suzanne B.
Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CA.. L. REv. 481 (2004) (focusing particularly on Grutter and Gratz); Leslie Friedman Goldstein, Between the Tiers: The
Nero[est] EqualProtectionand Bush v. Gore, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 372 (2002).
88. See infra Part I.B.I.
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justification for racial classifications in its 1978 decision in Regents ofthe

University of California v. Bakke, which struck down a quota-based affirmative action program for admission to the university's medical
school. 9 At the time, societal discrimination seemed too amorphous a
concept on which to build an equal protection analysis.90 Moreover, the
medical school characterized its interest as a way to mete out compensation to victims of discrimination, rather than a way to eliminate racial
hierarchy.91 Thirty years later, the legal community has a more sophisticated understanding of how racial inequality is perpetuated by social
structures, the reproduction of unconscious racism, and failure fully to
redress private acts of discrimination.
To the extent that the concept of structural inequality overlaps with
the concept of societal discrimination, the Court's rejection of the latter
must be understood in the context in which it occurred: affirmative action cases in which benefits were distributed based on racial
classification of individuals. Individual classification by race is particularly troubling to the Court. In contexts that do not require individual
classification, reducing inequality should be considered a compelling
state interest under either ordinary equal protection analysis or disparate
impact analysis. To hold otherwise would be to allow disparate impact
doctrine to complete the transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment
from a promise of equality to a tool for maintaining the status quo.93

89. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).

J., announcing judgment).
4
the state's purpose as compensatory
3
(characterizing
n.
&
306
at
U.S.
438
Bakke,
91.
and expressly reserving the possibility that a racial preference could be justified if it
were designed to compensate for unconscious bias).
92. See, e.g., Kimberld W. Crenshaw, Framing Affirmative Action, 105 MICH. L. REv.
FIRST IMPRESSIONs 123, 131-32 (2007) (describing structural inequality with a track
metaphor: "the problem affirmative action seeks to address is not damaged runners,
but damaged lanes that make the race more difficult for some competitors to run
than others"); Karlan, supra note 2, at 1374-77 (noting that in ParentsInvolved, "the
concurrence and the dissent saw racial separation as a persistent, and persistently constitutionally troubling, aspect of American society, while the majority saw the same
facts on the ground as something beyond the reach of government").
93. See generally Ivan E. Bodensteiner, The Supreme Court as the Major Barrier to Racial
Equality, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 199 (2009); Haney L6pez, supra note 27; Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than Race" The Inversion of
Privilege and Subordination in Equal ProtectionJurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV.
615 (2003); Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A CriticalReview of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV.

90. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 (Powell,

1049 (1978).
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1. Inequality in the Affirmative Action Cases
The Supreme Court's rejection of "societal discrimination" as a justification for racial classifications must be understood in context. In his
foundational opinion in Bakke, Justice Powell said that responding to
societal discrimination, for which the University's medical school was
not specifically responsible, could not justify affirmative action in the
school's admissions program. 4 The Court has generally adhered to Justice Powell's position with respect to affirmative action programs,
holding, for example, that generalized societal discrimination cannot
justify minority set-asides in government contracting.95 Nonetheless, the
Court's most recent cases indicate that structural inequality has a role to
play in evaluating the constitutionality of affirmative action.
The Court's most recent foray into this area at last produced majority opinions that settled several questions about affirmative action in
higher education. Grutter v. Bollinger96 and Gratz v. Bollinger challenged admissions programs at the University of Michigan. Gratz
involved the undergraduate program and Grutter the law school. The
Supreme Court held that the University had a compelling state interest
in the educational benefits of a diverse student body.98 The law school's
admissions program passed strict scrutiny because it evaluated each applicant holistically, without placing dispositive weight on race in any
particular case." The undergraduate program, however, was unconstitutional because it assigned specified points based on race and made race
dispositive in some cases.'" At the end of the Grutter opinion, the Court
announced an apparent sunset provision, stating that it did not expect
the law school's affirmative action program to be necessary for more
than another generation, about twenty-five years."o
In both Grutter and Gratz, the University of Michigan was careful
not to propound societal discrimination as its justification for affirmative action, relying instead on its interest in having a diverse student
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307-10 (Powell, J., announcing judgment).
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
539 U.S. 244 (2003).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325, 382-33.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334.
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342-43. For analysis of this aspect of the opinion, see, e.g.,
Spann, supra note 16, at 613-22; Joel K. Goldstein, justice O'Connor's Twenty-Five
Year Expectation: The Legitimacy ofDurational Limits in Grutter, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 83
(2006); Mark W. Cordes, Affirmative Action Afier Grutter and Gratz, 24 N. ILL. U.

L. REV. 691, 747-50 (2004).
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body for educational purposes. This strategy reflected the fact that Justice Powell's Bakke opinion had become the "touchstone for
02
constitutional analysis of race-conscious admissions policies." Accordingly, a defense based on societal discrimination would have been
doomed.
Nonetheless, Grutter's sunset clause indicates that existing inequality played a role in the Court's analysis. The University's primary interest
was in having a diverse student body. Existing conditions of inequality
made that goal difficult to achieve using its traditional admissions criteria. The Court acknowledged the existence of social inequality and the
fact that this inequality had an adverse effect on the educational interest
in diversity.'0 3 In the absence of affirmative action, the University would
have not only reflected but perpetuated the unequal status quo. Inequality thus served as a second-order justification for affirmative action. The
sunset clause expressed the hope that this background inequality, and
thus the need for affirmative action, would be eliminated within a generation. (After all, the law school's educational interest in a diverse
student body would not become more or less compelling with the passage of time.) The sunset clause was thus an implicit acknowledgement
that the Court's application of the Equal Protection Clause was contingent on existing structural inequality.0 4
In addition, the state interest in diversity itself contained an implicit equality component. Although the law school emphasized the
educational benefits of diversity, the Court spoke also of the social benefits of diversity in the professions.' 5 The law school needed a diverse
student body not only because students would learn better but also because it was necessary, for society's sake, "that the path to leadership be
visibly open."' 6 The law school's affirmative action program was

102. Grutter,539 U.S. at 323.
103. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 (recognizing the law school's compelling interest in a
diverse student body), 338 (stating that minority applicants are "less likely to be admitted in meaningful numbers on criteria that ignore [their] experiences" attributable
to "our Nation's struggle with racial inequality").
104. See Michelle Adams, Stifling the PotentialofGrutter v. Bollinger: Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 88 B.U. L. REV. 937, 938-39,
950-53 (2008) (discussing the non-pedagogical aspects of Grutter's diversity rationale); Kevin R. Johnson, The Last Twenty Five Years ofAffrrnative Action?, 21 CONST.
COMMENT. 171, 173 (2004) (noting that the sunset clause implies a remedial or
equality-seeking rationale in tension with the diversity rationale highlighted by the
Court).
105. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332.
106. Grutter,539 U.S. at 332.
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permissible, in part, because it would help remedy the stratification produced by the mechanisms of structural inequality.o7
In Grutter, then, structural inequality played a background role,
somewhat obscured by the educational interest in diversity. Bakke and
its progeny mean at most that eliminating inequality, by itself is not a
compelling state interest sufficient to justify traditionalaffirmative action
programs. That is not the same as saying that eliminating inequality is
never a compelling state interest.'os The two steps of strict scrutiny are
not so isolated from each other that the acceptability of the means cannot affect whether a particular interest is deemed compelling.'09 The
Court's fundamental objection to affirmative action is not to the goalwhether that be diversity or equality, both of which the Court invoked
in Grutter-but to the means.
2. Holistic Evaluation and the Problem of Racial Adjudication
Traditional affirmative action programs promote equal opportunity
by classifying individuals on the basis of race and using those classifications to distribute benefits. It is primarily this act of classification, not
the state interest in equality, to which the Supreme Court has usually
objected.no

The term racialadjudication,coined by Andrew Carlon, refers to a
governmental practice of defining racial categories and placing individuals into one category or another for the purpose of distributing benefits
or burdens."' Racial adjudication is only one kind of racialclassification,
since government can use race in other ways-record-keeping or general
policy decisions-that do not involve distributing benefits or burdens to
individuals." 2 Racial adjudications, such as affirmative action programs,
107. Cf Johnson, supra note 104, at 173.
108. It also does not rule out the possibility that traditional affirmative action programs
would be permissible for the purpose of eliminating inequality on a showing that
other means were ineffective.
109. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 455 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (both arguing that
the Court in truth applies a multi-factored sliding scale analysis when analyzing equal
protection claims); see also supra note 84 (citing literature on Supreme Court's apparent drift away from rigid tiers of scrutiny).
110. See Parents Involved in Cmry. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 79697 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
111. Andrew M. Carlon, RacialAdjudication, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1151, 1159-60 (2007)
(defining racialadjudication).
112. See id. at 1158-59.
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are more troubling to the Supreme Court than other racial classifications.'1
The Court's discomfort with racial categorization was apparent
even as it upheld the University of Michigan's law school admissions
program. One of the more frustrating aspects of the Grutter and Gratz
decisions was the Court's apparent preference for obscurity in the decision-making process of an affirmative action program. The Court
preferred the law school's "holistic" approach that did not assign numerical values to race or other elements of diversity, rather than the
undergraduate point system."' As Justice Ginsburg argued, "If honesty
is the best policy, surely Michigan's accurately described, fully disclosed
College affirmative action program is preferable to achieving similar
numbers through winks, nods, and disguises."" 5
Two factors are likely to have driven the Court's preference for the
opaque rather than the transparent process. First is a preference for suppressing controversy and conflict."' If there are to be racial preferences
in admissions, better that they be obscured so that no one can say for
sure what effect they had, and fewer feelings will be hurt."7
113. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 796-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring the judgment); Robinson, supra note 2, at 345-47 (discussing the intrinsic
harms of racial classification); Robin A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race,
Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 803, 870-71 (2004) (describing
the potential for stigmatic harm due to governmental race classifications).
114. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334-39 (2003) (favorably describing the law
school's program and concluding that it was narrowly tailored); Gratz v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 244, 270-74 (2003) (concluding that the undergraduate point system was
not narrowly tailored).
115. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 305 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
116. See Delahunty, supra note 31, at 69 (arguing that the Court's strategy has been to
pursue a brokered peace by allowing limited affirmative action rather than choosing
between competing visions of racial justice) ("The opacity of the law school's raceconscious admissions process was its virtue, the transparency of the college's admissions process was its vice. Opacity in this context mutes racial envy and antagonism,
transparency breeds them."); cf Laurence H. Tribe, Erog v. Shub and Its Disguises:
Freeing Bush v. Gore From Its Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARv. L. REv. 170, 287-88
(2001) (discussing the Court's reaction to the perceived chaos of post-2000 election
Florida and concluding, "To judge from what this Court does, not what it says, high
on [its] list of values is the preservation of a stable order and of an appearance of regularity. Low on that list is an energized, politicized, unruly electorate struggling to find
its way toward concrete outcomes .... ); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 866-69 (1992) (arguing that vociferous popular protest against Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), was all the more reason to re-affirm rather than overrule
it) (discussed in Tribe, supra, at 289-90).
117. Cf Primus,supra note 47 (arguing that Ricci, as well as Grutter and Parents Involved,
could be read to prohibit affirmative action measures that have "visible victims"). The
presence of identifiable victims is closely connected to the use of individual racial
classifications, discussed in the next paragraph.

420

MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW

[Vol. 16:397

Second is the Court's discomfort with the mere act of classifying
individuals by race. To classify individuals by race, the government must
have a definition of race, something the Supreme Court has not had to
confront since it rejected Homer Plessy's claim that he was white."'
Slavery, Jim Crow, and legal segregation all required an official system
for stamping each person with a racial label, often using the infamous
"one drop of blood" rule." 9 A point system for affirmative action admissions requires each person to be classified, even if not necessarily under
the same rule.120 Under a holistic system, the classification can be
fudged. The increasing proportion of the population who check "other"
when asked their race can, in fact, be treated as individuals rather than
forced into one of a few categories. A holistic system avoids the potential
for litigation in which a court is asked to decide whether the government has applied the wrong racial label to a modern-day Homer Plessy.
The Parents Involved opinions highlighted the evils of racial adjudication. The plurality framed its holding as concerned with the
distribution of "burdens or benefits on the basis of individual racial classifications."' 2 Justice Kennedy criticized the Seattle school district's
"blunt distinction between 'white' and 'nonwhite,'" which tells "each
student he or she is to be defined by race." 22

118. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 541-42, 549, 552 (1896) (holding that the
state could choose how to define race for purposes of its Jim Crow laws).
119. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 5 n.4 (1967) (quoting Virginia statutes defining white persons as those with "no trace whatever of any blood other than
Caucasian," with a minor exception designed to "honor[] the descendants of John
Rolfe and Pocahontas").
120. Most affirmative action programs rely on self-identification, a system which has generated surprisingly little controversy (at least to the point of inspiring litigation) over
the correctness of those self-designations. See Carlon, supra note 111, at 1164-65
(noting that there are few documented instances of "abuse" of affirmative action by
non-minorities). Slightly more common are disputes over "close cases," such as
whether a person of Arab descent is "white." See id; Al-Khazraji v. St. Francis Coll.,
784 F.2d 505, 514-18 (1986) (invoking congressional intent to hold that an Arab
plaintiff could proceed with a race discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, regardless of whether Arabs were "taxonomically Caucasian"). For an example of what
the Supreme Court presumably wants to avoid, see Edward C. Thomas, Racial Classification and the Flawed Pursuit of Diversity: How Phantom Minorities Threaten
"CriticalMass"Justificationin HigherEducation, 2007 BYU L. REV. 813 (2007) (arguing that universities that fail to establish and enforce precise racial definitions have
failed to narrowly tailor their affirmative action programs to their interest in diverse
student bodies).
121. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720

(2007).
122. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 787-89 (Kennedy,
ring in the judgment).

J.,

concurring in part and concur-

CONTINGENT EQUAL PROTECTION

2010]

421

The weight this concern should receive is certainly open to debate. 123 It is, however, a legitimate concern that is important to the
Court's swing vote. It is therefore worth isolating the effect of the racial
adjudication problem, in order to avoid over-generalizing the Court's
existing precedents. That is, the Court's hostility to racial adjudication
should not be allowed to taint the state interest in equality. In the interplay of state interests with narrow tailoring that is strict scrutiny,
equality may be a compelling state interest even if it is not always strong
enough for the Court to allow racial adjudication as the means to
achieve it.

The Court's aversion to racial adjudication makes it inappropriate
to allow the affirmative action cases to stand for the general proposition
that equality is not a compelling state interest. The Court's rejection of
societal discrimination as a compelling interest should be understood in
context. The affirmative action programs struck down in Gratz and
Bakke required classification of individuals into fixed racial categories. In
contrast, the Court's acknowledgement of existing inequality played at
least some role in upholding the law school's program in Grutter,which
avoided strict racial adjudication. 2 4 Grutter and Gratz, then, should be
understood as leaving open the possibility of structural inequality as a
compelling state interest.
3. Structural Inequality as a Compelling State Interest
ParentsInvolved required the Court to confront whether the equality interest it had seemed to reject in affirmative action cases could be

compelling in the K-12 assignment context. No kind of diversity other
than racial diversity was at stake, so the "holistic evaluation" approach
proved a dead end. 125 Although the Court struck down the Seattle and
Louisville integration plans, the dissent and Justice Kennedy's concurrence both recognized the state interest in racial equality.126 They thus
123. See, e.g., ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 867 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("This is not to
deny that there is a cost in applying 'a state-mandated racial label.' But that cost does
not approach, in degree or in kind, the terrible harms of slavery, the resulting caste
system, and 80 years of legal racial segregation.") (quoting id. at 797 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
124. See supra Part I.B.1.
125. All that Louisville obtained by trying to present its assignment plan as flexible and
holistic was Justice Kennedy's criticism that the plan was too confusing. See Parents
Involved, 551 U.S. at 784-86 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
126. See ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 788 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) (rejecting the implication of the plurality opinion that states "must
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preserved for the moment the viability of an equal protection analysis
contingent on existing conditions of structural inequality. The plurality,
however, strongly suggested that it would have struck down the plans
because there was no compelling, or perhaps even legitimate, interest in
racial integration. 127 This same rejection of equality as a state interest lies
beneath Justice Scalia's proposal for holding Title VII's disparate impact
rules unconstitutional. 128
Parents Involved dealt with both the Seattle and the Louisville integration plans. Although the plurality concluded that the plans were not
narrowly tailored, it went even further to reject the claimed state interest
in integration. The plurality argued that the focus on race alone belied a
generalized interest in student body diversity. 129 That left the school districts to rely on an interest that was variously characterized as
"reduc[ing] racial concentration" or "ensur[ing] that racially concentrated housing patterns do not prevent nonwhite students from having
access to the most desirable schools."3 o The stated rationales carefully
avoided the term "racial balancing," which the Court had vilified in
Grutter."' In truth, however, the asserted state interest boiled down to
undoing de facto segregation and structural inequality. 3 2 The plurality

127.

128.
129.

130.
131.
132.

accept the status quo of racial isolation in schools"), 797-98 (recognizing a compelling interest in "avoiding racial isolation"); id. at 838-45 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(describing a compelling interest in diversity or integration with three elements: historical/remedial, educational, and democratic).
See ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 725-33 (plurality opinion) (arguing that there is no
compelling interest in preventing resegregation); id at 751 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(arguing that there is no interest at all in "preventing resegregation").
See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681-83 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).
See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 723 (plurality opinion) ("[T]he plans here employ
only a limited notion of diversity."; "[Race] is not simply one factor weighed with
others in reaching a decision as in Grutter it is the factor.") (emphasis in original).
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 725-26 (plurality opinion) (summarizing the claimed
state interests).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003).
This Article accepts the premise that a purpose and at least possible effect of integration is to reduce structural racial inequality, while acknowledging that people of good
faith disagree about whether integration plans are the best strategy from either an
equality or an educational perspective. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Unintended
Lessons in Brown v. Board of Education, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1053 (2004-05)
("The good news today is that educators and parents are ignoring the siren song that
integration is an essential component of a good school."). There are good reasons for
viewing so-called defacto segregation as both a symptom and a mechanism of structural inequality, as opposed to a mere reflection of personal choices. See Robinson,
supra note 2, at 325-36 (arguing that racial isolation is subordinating); Martha Minow, After Brown: What Would Martin Luther King Say?, 12 LEWIs & CLRK L. REv.
599, 607-22 (2008) (discussing the historical link between integration and equality).
With respect to education, Parents Involved suggests two ways in which the school
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would have struck down both plans on the grounds that these interests
were not compelling-or, in at least Justice Thomas's view, even legitimate-because they took race into account."'
Although Justice Kennedy agreed with the plurality on the outcome, he sided with the dissent on the question of the state interest: he
district might see integration as a response to inequality. First, the racially identifiable
schools in Seattle were separate but not equal, as the district acknowledged by arguing
that its integration plan was necessary "to make sure that racially segregated housing
patterns did not prevent non-white students from having equitable access to the most
popular over-subscribed schools." ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 786-87 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). This pattern is so entrenched
that it is often invisible, as was reflected in one of Justice Scalia's hypotheticals in the
oral argument of the Louisville case. In the course of asking about how to distinguish
benign from invidious racial motives, Justice Scalia posited schools that were equal in
all respects except racial makeup while simultaneously stipulating that the white
schools were the good schools. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 35-36, Meredith
v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (No. 05-915). Second, if the
purpose of education is not merely to increase scores on standardized math and reading tests but to produce citizens who have absorbed democratic values, integrated
schooling is likely preferable. See ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("The Nation's schools strive to
teach that our strength comes from people of different races, creeds, and cultures
uniting in commitment to the freedom of all."); Minow, supra, at 639 (discussing the
purposes of education); Ryan, supra note 2, at 132 (arguing that Parents Involved will
have little effect on the ground because, inter alia, today's focus is test scores, not citizenship), 142-44 ("The idea that schools should also teach students from diverse
backgrounds how to cooperate in preparation for citizenship, like the idea of integration, has been pushed into the background."); see, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The
Seattle and Louisville School Cases: There Is No Other Way, 121 HARv. L. Rav. 158,
182 (2007) (equating education with training to master specific skills); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 347 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (mocking
the suggestion that law schools, as opposed to kindergartens, should teach citizenship). But see Jennifer S. Hendricks, "We Reserve the Right to Refuse Service to
Anyone. ", 76 TENN. L. REV. 417 (2009) (reflecting on teaching constitutional law as
citizenship for lawyers).
The values and cross-racial understanding that integrated schooling may produce can be viewed through a race-as-ethnicity lens or as breaking down one of the
mechanisms of structural inequality. See Heather K. Gerken, Justice Kennedy and the
Domains of EqualProtection, 121 HARv. L. REV. 104, 116 (2007) (arguing that Justice Kennedy's opinion in Parents Involved reflects concern for the schools' ability to
teach civic morality) ("[Elven a judge committed to the colorblind ideal might worry
. . . that the value of colorblindness cannot be learned in a racially segregated
school."). The possibility that integration serves these ends is at least strong enough
that a state actor should be allowed the chance to show that it has narrowly tailored
its own integration efforts to achieve them.
133. ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 729-33 (plurality opinion) (concluding that an interest
in racial integration, which "cannot be the goal," is equivalent to racial balancing); see
also id. at 751 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[Tlhe school districts lack an interest in
preventing resegregation."). See Black, supra note 22, at 979 (describing the plurality
opinion as arguing "that these school districts cannot use race at all.").
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accepted that the claimed state interest in avoiding racial isolation was
compelling."' His objection to the schools' plans came at the second
step of the strict scrutiny analysis, the requirement of narrow tailoring.
The substance of that objection was to the state's classification of individuals by race: "[O]fficial labels proclaiming the race of all persons in a
broad class of citizens ... are unconstitutional as the cases now come to
us. ,,135
Justice Kennedys point of disagreement with the plurality thus
made explicit what had been implicit in prior affirmative action cases.
The Court's seeming protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, the
state has a compelling interest in combating the status quo. In crafting
policy to serve that interest, however, some means are more acceptable
than others, and racial adjudication must be kept as a last resort.13 6
Interestingly, Justice Kennedy's opinion progressed from a Grutterlike diversity rationale to equality concerns as he discussed different
kinds of state action. When discussing acceptable state interests for individual classifications, he spoke in terms of diversity, and squarely within
the race-as-ethnicity perspective.' 7 From this perspective, race is one of
many personal characteristics that make up the range of human experience, but it does not necessarily implicate a hierarchy."'3 Ian Haney
L6pez has chronicled how this conception of race promotes a doctrine
of strict colorblindness at the expense of other Fourteenth Amendment
values, particularly the elimination of racial subordination.'
Justice
134. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 783-84, 797-98 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (summarizing disagreement with plurality); id. at
787-88 ("The plurality opinion is too dismissive of the legitimate interest government has in ensuring all people have equal opportunity regardless of their race.").
135. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment). See Joshua 0. Oluwole & Preston C. Greene III, Parents Involved
and Race-ConsciousMeasures: A Causefor Optimism, 26 BUFF. Pun. INT. L.J. 1, 27-28
("[Wihat Justice Kennedy condemns is not typing by race, but rather individualtyping by race.").
136. See ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 790 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) ("And individual racial classifications employed in this manner may
be considered legitimate only if they are a last resort to achieve a compelling interest.").
137. See Hahey L6pez, supra note 27 at 1006-11 (describing the development of an ideology that treats race as a form of ethnicity).
138. See id at 990 (arguing that the ethnicity perspective "suggested that racial subordination was largely past and that social inequalities, if any, reflected the cultural failings
of minorities themselves.").
139. See id. at 990 ("[M]y primary aim in this Article is to demonstrate that race-asethnicity provided the first coherent intellectual justification for reactionary colorblindness."); id. at 1011-12 (arguing that "ethnicity operated [to depict] affirmative
action, not as a needed national response to racial subordination, but instead as the
sort of group rent-seeking one would expect in the context of ethnic group competi-
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Kennedy's critique of the Seattle plan fits squarely within this tradition.140 His main objection to the Seattle plan was to its "blunt
distinction between 'white' and 'nonwhite,"' which failed to account for
substantial racial and ethnic diversity in the "nonwhite" category. 141
When Justice Kennedy discussed the educational benefits of diversity,
racial difference was merely a matter of perspective, not hierarchy.
When he turned, however, to the question of alternative, raceconscious integration measures, Justice Kennedy spoke the language of
equality. He opened with a nod to racial progress that acknowledged
"the flaws and injustices that remain" and the need for "assurance that
opportunity is not denied on account of race." 4 2 The state interest at
stake was the government's interest in "ensuring all people have equal
opportunity regardless of their race.""' He took on the plurality's invocation of Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, explaining that
"our Constitution is colorblind" must be read in context. 44 He summed
up his disagreement with the plurality as follows: "To the extent the plurality opinion suggests the Constitution mandates that state and local
authorities must accept the status quo of racial isolation in schools, it is,
in my view, profoundly mistaken." Justice Kennedy thus made clear
that he supports state efforts to reduce structural inequality, but only if
racial adjudication is avoided.

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

tion"; see also Freeman, supra note 93 (arguing that colorblindness represents the perpetrator's perspective in discrimination law).
Cf Gerken, supra note 132, at 108 (referring to the "anti-essentialist boilerplate" in
Kennedy's opinion).
ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 787 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 787 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 788 (Kennedy, J., concurring in pat and concurring in
the judgment).
ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 788 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896).
ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 788 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment). This statement also serves as an appropriate rejoinder to Justice Thomas's invocation of another famous line, paraphrasing, "The Fourteenth Amendment
does not enact the dissent's newly minted understanding of liberty."). Id at 767 n. 15
(Thomas, J., concurring); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) ("The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics."). The Parents Involved dissent would not have enacted any particular
understanding of liberty or equality; it would merely have permitted the people of
Seattle and Louisville to pursue their understanding. It was the Parents Involved plurality that, like the Lochner Court, sought to constitutionalize a particular social
theory (in both cases, to maintain a status quo of unequal power and to protect it
against legislative interference).
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The claim that societal discrimination is not a compelling state interest has been repeated so often in affirmative action cases that it has
taken on a life of its own. It has thus become capable of threatening not
only programs that depend on facial classifications but even race-neutral
forms of affirmative action. At the same time, however, the Supreme
Court's own reasoning has invoked the state's interest in equality and
demonstrated that the real objection is to means that rely too heavily on
racial adjudication. The government's ability to practice the contingent
form of equal protection narrowly survived ParentsInvolved. Despite all
the inveighing against racial balancing, the problem in Parents Involved
was not in the fact that racial balance was sought but in how it was
achieved. The government can legitimately seek racial integration, but it
must try to do so without stamping each person with a racial identity.1
Subject to limits that reflect that concern, the state has a compelling interest in overcoming structural inequality.
II.

CONTINGENT EQUAL PROTECTION AND SEX INEQUALITY

After centuries of pernicious racial classifications, judicial scrutiny
became strict just as states were becoming more likely to enact racial
classifications that could plausibly be described as benign or remedial.1 7
Scrutiny of sex classifications remains formally less strict."' As a result,
contingent equal protection has flourished in sex cases far more than in
race cases. 9 Indeed, in the context of sex classifications, contingent
equal protection can be generalized to include state action premised not
just on social inequality but also on what the Supreme Court has perceived as biological inequality.5 o Moreover, classification of individuals
according to sex, rather than race, is not troubling to the Court."' Isolating that factor and uniting the sex and race cases under the rubric of
contingent equal protection reveals the conceptual bankruptcy of the
146. See ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 790 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
147. See generally Bodensteiner, supra note 93.
148. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (formally adhering to intermediate scrutiny for sex classifications); Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001)
(demonstrating that United States v. Virginia had not ratcheted up review of sex classifications by applying extremely deferential review to a sex classification clearly
rooted in stereotypes).
149. See infra Part II.A.
150. See infra Part II.B. In the cases discussed below, the Court typically characterizes
women's biology as imposing a burden, rather than as a difference that can be a burden or an ability to varying degrees depending on social structures.
151. See infra notes 168-172 and accompanying text.
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Parents Involved plurality's attempt to reject the state's compelling interest in equality.
Part II.A discusses the Court's greater tolerance for sex classifications designed to remedy structural inequality. It argues that this
tolerance is attributable to the Court's comfort with governmentimposed, binary sex classifications, as compared to its discomfort with
racial adjudication. The contingent equal protection cases involving sex
classifications thus repudiate (and are threatened by) the claim that the
government lacks a compelling interest in eliminating structural inequality. Part II.B extends this argument to sex cases that involve
biological sex differences in lieu of other structural inequality. This extension to "real differences" cases provides the groundwork for Part III's
discussion of future developments in contingent equal protection.
A. StructuralInequality and Sex Classifications
One of the ironies of equal protection doctrine is that it is easier to
justify remedial sex classifications than to justify remedial or benign racial classifications.' 52 Doctrinally, this discrepancy is a function of the
lower level of scrutiny for sex classifications, which gives the government
more leeway in shaping gender relations.'" Of course, governments often use this leeway to perpetuate stereotypes and inequality.'" They can

152. See Mary K. O'Melveny, Playing the "Gender" Card:Affinative Action and Working
Women, 84 Ky. L. REv. 863, 864-65 (1996). ("Ironically, the unwillingness to employ strict scrutiny for gender-based classifications means that, under the Court's
most recent rulings on affirmative action issues, affirmative action programs for
women may survive challenge where comparable race-based programs will not. Or, to
put the issue another way, white men may look to greater constitutional protections
from race-based affirmative action plans (however well-intentioned) than exist for
women challenging programs that discriminate based upon sex.") (footnote omitted).
153. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976) (adopting the intermediate standard of review for sex classifications). Intermediate scrutiny requires that the state
action be substantially related to an important state interest, id, as opposed to strict
scrutiny's requirement that state action be narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest, Johnson v. California, 542 U.S. 499, 505 (2005).
154. See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (upholding naturalization laws that
distinguish among foreign-born children according to the sex of the citizen parent,
based in part on a governmental interest in avoiding citizenship claims by foreignborn children of U.S. servicemen and businessmen). Although I have criticized the
analyses of both the majority and the dissent regarding the statute's presumption of a
connection between mother and child, the dissent was correct that the statute rested
on archaic gender stereotypes. See Jennifer S. Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, 13
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 429, 470 (2007) (noting points of agreement with the
Nguyen dissent).
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also use it, however, to try to improve the relative status of women, including through affirmative action programs.155
A striking example of a remedial sex classification was the compensatory social security program upheld in Cahfano v. Webster."' For
several years, women and men were subject to different rules for excluding their low-earning years from the social security benefits
calculation.157 The result was higher benefits for a woman than for a
man with the same earning history."' The Supreme Court had no trouble accepting the important state interest justifying this rule:
"[r]eduction of the disparity in economic condition between men and
women caused by the long history of discrimination against women."
Less dramatically, the same state interest has justified affirmative action
for women in areas such as public employment, which has proceeded
with far less controversy than what swirls around race-based affirmative
action."o Equal protection analysis contingent on the fact of existing
inequality is thus well established in the field of sex classifications."
Importantly, the gender differential in Webster was intended to redress private discrimination in employment. There was no suggestion
that Congress was at fault or had itself violated the Equal Protection
Clause by, say, failing to outlaw discrimination by private actors.162 The

155. See, e.g., Johnson v. Santa Clara County Trans. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (upholding a sex-based affirmative action program against a Title VII challenge).
156. 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam).

157.
158.
159.
160.

Califano, 430 U.S.
Califano, 430 U.S.
Califano, 430 U.S.
See Debra Frazese,

at 314-16.
at 316.
at 317.
The Gender Curve: An Analysis of Colleges' Use ofAffirnative Action

Policies to Benefit Male Applicants, 56 Am. U. L. REv. 719 (2007); O'Melveny, supra
note 152, at 864-65. But see Celia M. Ruiz, Legal Standards RegardingGender Equity
and Affirmative Action, 100 ED. L. REP. 841, 844 (1995) (discussing the Sixth Circuit's application of strict scrutiny to sex-based affirmative action in order to
eliminate this anomaly). In the educational context, some institutions now engage in
"reverse" affirmative action in order to maintain parity between male and female admissions. See Frazese, supra note 160 (arguing that such policies are unconstitutional
because they are based on stereotypes and unsupported by any pedagogical objective).
161. The Supreme Court regularly cites Webster and the state interest in redressing past
economic discrimination against women when cataloguing acceptable governmental
uses of sex classifications. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533
(1996); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 728 (1982); see also Orr v.
Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 280 (1979) (citing Webster with approval).
162. While the Equal Protection Clause might have been read to require Congress or the
states to enact non-discrimination laws, the Supreme Court has never gone down that
road. Cf LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUrTIoNA LAw 1695 n.16 (2d ed.
1988) (suggesting that in The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), the Supreme
Court should have held that Congress had power to intervene under Section 5 of the
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inequality that justified this sex classification is thus analogous to the
structural inequality that the ParentsInvolved plurality called into question as a justification for race-conscious action. It is the sort of
inequality that does not meet the test for state action and thus does not
trigger a judicial remedy under the Equal Protection Clause. Nonetheless, Congress had a legitimate interest in redressing the existing
inequality. Congress's ability to favor women in the benefits calculation
was contingent on that inequality. The ParentsInvolved plurality's refusal
to apply the same contingent equal protection analysis to remedies for
racial inequality is inconsistent not only with repeated signals that raceneutral affirmative action is constitutional but also with the Court's willingness to apply the same analytical structure to the remediation of sex
inequality.
Of course, there are differences between race and sex-in doctrine
and in reality-that might explain different outcomes. It is difficult to
imagine the Court upholding a compensatory social security system
similar to Webster but designed to compensate individual members of
racial minorities for private employment discrimination. 16'A racial Webster would apply a different level of scrutiny. It would also reflect the
Court's greater aversion to racial classification of individuals. Breaking
down the analysis, however, reveals that the difference cannot lie in the
legitimacy or weight of the state interest in ameliorating racial inequality
as compared to sex inequality. Rather, the difference lies in what the
Court considers acceptable means for ameliorating different kinds of
equality.
Judicial scrutiny of sex classifications is, at least in theory, less intense than scrutiny of race classifications in two ways. First, a race
classification must serve a "compelling" state interest, while a sex classification need serve only an "important" state interest. " Second, the
means of achieving the state interest must be appropriate: If the means
Fourteenth Amendment when a state had repealed its common law rule of equal access).
163. It is perhaps even more difficult to imagine that Congress would enact such a program. In addition to the doctrinal factors discussed in the text, a third reason that
such a program would be neither enacted nor upheld is that redistribution of wealth
on the basis of sex is much less radical than redistribution on the basis of race. Wealth
is typically held by families, which are mixed-sex far more often than mixed-race. For
those who were dependent on social security for survival, the sex differential upheld
in Webster probably helped some older women get by. Given, however, that social security pays more to higher earners, the primary beneficiaries of the differential would
have been the families of relatively prosperous, mostly white women.
164. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (strict scrutiny); Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976) (intermediate scrutiny); United States v. Virginia, 518
U.S. 515, 524 (1996) ("exceedingly persuasive justification").
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include a race classification, it must be "narrowly tailored" to the state
interest.16 ' A sex classification need only be "substantially related" to the
state interest or, when the Court is feeling particularly hostile to sex classifications, have an "exceedingly persuasive" justification.'6 If a racial
Webster would come out differently, then the difference must lie either
in the state interest asserted or in the means used to effectuate that interest.
The Supreme Court has never provided a comparative analysis of
the difference between "important" and "compelling" state interests.
Indeed, it has barely distinguished between those categories and other
legitimate state interests. Most legitimate state interests seem capable of
being deemed at least important, with the sole exception of mere administrative convenience.' 67 While the "compelling" category may yet turn
out to be narrower than the "important" category, the state interest in
fighting inequality is obviously the wrong place to draw that line. To
hold that equality is an important but not compelling goal under the
FourteenthAmendment would be bizarre, even where the equality sought
is more positive and substantive than the negative right to equal treatment enforced by the Court. Equally as strange would be a holding that
racial inequality was a lesser concern than sex inequality under that
Amendment. Thus, if contingent equal protection analysis produces
different outcomes in race and sex cases, it cannot be because of the
formal difference between "important" and "compelling" state interest.
The Court has similarly failed to explicate the difference between
"narrowly tailored" and "substantially related" means for achieving state
interests by way of race or sex classifications. One of the reasons, however, that sex classifications trigger a lower level of scrutiny is that the
Court does not consider the government's classification of an individual
as female or male to be inherently offensive. In Bakke, Justice Powell
explained that sex classifications do not create the same "analytical and
practical problems" as race classifications because "there are only two
possible classifications" and thus "no rival groups" to claim entitlements."8 Thirty years later, the Court has not yet confronted cases
165. SeeJohnson v. California,543 U.S. at 505.
166. See U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 524; but see Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 78-80
(2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (complaining that the majority had abandoned the
"exceedingly persuasive" requirement).
167. See Craig,429 U.S. at 197-98 (noting prior rejection of state interests in reducing
probate court workload and administrative ease and convenience).
168. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 302-03 (1978) (Powell, J.,
announcing judgment). Justice Powell added that the perception of racial classifications as inherently odious stems from a "lengthy and tragic history that gender-based
classifications do not share." Id. at 303.
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involving intersexed or transsexual individuals under the Equal Protection Clause. It has barely scratched the surface of other claims involving
individuals whose gender or sexual identity resists binary classification.
The Court's awkward stumbling in cases involving homosexuality does
6
not bespeak a Court inclined to question its binary definition of sex. '
Lower court cases reflect a similar insistence on the binary determinability of sex. In Title VII cases, courts faced with questions about
"correct" racial classification have in recent years fallen back on social
reality and perception rather than purportedly scientific definitions of
race.o70 Not so for sex classifications. In cases ranging from discrimination to the validity of marriages, courts have insisted on a binary,
biological definition.17 ' Although this approach is unrealistic and harmful in many contexts,172 its prevalence illuminates contingent equal
protection doctrine: sex cases demonstrate what courts and other state
actors may do in the face of historic and persisting inequality when the
classification itself is not deemed pernicious.
Because of the greater tolerance for individual classification, a
greater variety of means remain open to a state actor seeking to ameliorate sex inequality. To implement a Webster-like program for race,
Congress would have to define each person's race with the precision of
Jim Crow.17 ' That act of classification-not the state interest in equality-is what distinguishes ParentsInvolved from Webster.
169. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Sers., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (holding that
same-sex sexual harassment can be actionable under Title VII, but failing to provide
useful guidance for determining when such harassment is "because of sex," as required by the statute). On the question of when adverse action is "because of sex," see
generally Jennifer S. Hendricks, Women and the Promise ofEqual Citizenship, 8 TEx. J.
WOMEN & L. 51, 85-91 (1998) (discussing "animus based on gender" under the Violence Against Women Act and "because of sex" under Title VII as applied to sexual
harassment cases).
170. See, e.g., Al-Khazraji v. St. Francis College, 784 F.2d 505, 514-18 (1986) (invoking
congressional intent to hold that an Arab plaintiff could proceed with a race discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, regardless of whether Arabs were
"taxonomically Caucasian").
171. See generallyJulie Greenberg, Defining Male and Female, 41 Amiz. L. REv. 265, 292325 (1999) (surveying cases illustrative of "law's insistence on clinging to a binary
system that traditionally ignores the importance of self-identification").
172. See Elizabeth Reilly, Radical Tweak: Relocating the Power to Assign Sex, 12 CARDozo
J.L. & GENDER 297, 301-07 (2005) (summarizing literature about the effects on individuals of medical and legal enforcement of binary sex categories).
173. In fact, to accurately reflect past discrimination, Congress might well adopt definitions of race from the very laws that structured de jure segregation. Cf Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 541-42, 549, 552 (1896) (discussing Homer Plessy's claim
to property right in whiteness); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 5 n.4 (1967) (quoting
Virginia's statutes defining race).
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Under Grutter/Gratzand Parents Involved, the act of racial classification, not the desire to reduce inequality, is what created problems
under the Equal Protection Clause. The sex cases, which eliminate this
classification problem but are otherwise analytically the same, prove that
the Court's complaint has never been with the legitimacy of the state
interest in equality. The ParentsInvolved plurality's attempt to brand that
interest as illegitimate is as false to precedent as it is to the Fourteenth
Amendment itself.
B. Real Differences and Sex Classifications
In the race and sex cases discussed so far, contingent equal protection has two features. First, the contingency-the state interest that
justifies race- or sex-conscious action-is an existing condition of structural inequality. Second, the contingent analysis creates government
power rather than individual rights: a state actor can choose either to
redress or to ignore the existing inequality. This section generalizes the
first feature of contingent equal protection to include state action intended to accommodate biological sex differences. Part III considers the
second feature and the distinction between government choice and individual entitlement to remediation of inequality.
Accommodating sex differences usually means accommodating
women's differences, given a male norm. Accommodation, like affirmative action, is a conservative response to inequality, since it retains the
status quo and treats members of the disadvantaged group as exceptions."' As with affirmative action, the Supreme Court has never held
that governments are required to take even this small step toward substantive equality for women.' But unlike the race-based affirmative
174. Accommodation does, nonetheless, promote equality, and the failure to accommodate is thus the practical and normative equivalent of discrimination. See generally
Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARv. L. REv. 642
(2001); Samuel R. Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination,"Accommodation, and the
Politics of(Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825 (2003).
175. See Sylvia Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 962
(1984) (cataloguing the real differences cases); see also Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53
(2001); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). In all of these cases, the Supreme Court either upheld the government's policy or (in United States v. Virginia)
struck down a policy treating women and men differently because the Court rejected
the government's claim that they were differently situated. The Court has never
struck down a policy of facial sex-neutrality (no matter how superficial, see Geduldig
v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)) because it failed to account for biological difference.
Cf Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977) (stating that Congress's change of
heart-repealing the sex-differential in the social security rules-did not affect the
Court's analysis of whether Congress had the power to enact the differential).
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action cases, the "real differences" cases have easily permitted governments to choose accommodation. With the problem of an inherently
pernicious classification removed, government is free to seek affirmative,
substantive equality. The real differences cases thus further demonstrate
that the Parents Involved plurality's rejection of the state interest in
7
equality is unfounded in prior equal protection jurisprudence.' 1
1. The Real Differences Cases
Sylvia Law and Ann Freedman first identified the real differences
cases as those in which the Supreme Court invokes natural sex differ7
ences to justify different legal treatment of men and women.' Of
course, the Court's perception of which differences are natural has
7
the Court perchanged over time. In the infamous Bradwell v. Illinois,"'
ceived men and women as differently situated, by biology and the "law
of the Creator,"17 with respect to the practice of law. Purported natural
differences also justified early labor restrictions for female workers when
80
men's contractual rights were still subject to Lochner v. New York.1
More recently, the Court has been receptive to real differences argu8
ments only when the link to reproductive biology is more direct. ' In

176. As discussed in Part II.A, supra, the difference between "compelling" state interests
under strict scrutiny and "important" state interests under intermediate scrutiny cannot plausibly distinguish the cases.
177. Law, supra note 175, at 962; Ann E. Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Diferences, and the
Supreme Court, 92 YALE L.J. 913 (1983). They identified the following as real differences cases: Michael M. v. Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (statutory rape a crime
only when committed by male against female); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57
(1981) (male-only registration for the draft); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321
(1977) (exclusion of women from contact jobs in prisons); Gen. Elec. v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. 125 (1976) (exclusion of pregnancy from disability benefits policy offered by a
private employer); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (separate rules for
male and female officers under navy's up-or-out policy); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S.
48 (1974) (exclusion of pregnancy from the disability benefits policy offered by a
public employer); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (mandatory pregnancy leave).
178. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872) (holding that the state could exclude women from the
practice of law).
179. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 142.
180. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down maximum hours laws for (presumably male) bakers); see Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding maximum hours law for
women working in laundries).
181. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (striking down a male-only admissions policy for a public, quasi-military college), is an example of a failed modern
attempt to restore the real differences category to its former scope. See 518 U.S. at
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Michael M v. Superior Court, for example, the Court accepted women's
vulnerability to pregnancy as a justification for sex-specific statutory
rape laws.' 82 In Dothardv. Rawlinson, the Court equated femaleness with
rapeability to justify restricting employment opportunities for female
*
183
prison guards.
The most infamous of the real differences cases is Geduldig v.
Ailleo.'14 Geduldig involved a comprehensive short-term disability policy
for state employees in California. The Court held that the exclusion
only of pregnancy from coverage under the policy was not sex discrimination. The policy, said the Court, did not distinguish between women
and men but between "pregnant women and nonpregnant persons."185
The Constitution did not require the state to make up for what the
Court perceived as a natural disadvantage in the labor market.
Other cases, however, show that the state may choose to enact laws
to promote sex equality in the face of sex differences. After the Court
extended Geduldig's cramped conception of sex discrimination to Title VII, 86
' Congress responded with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
(PDA). '7 The PDA defines discrimination "because of sex" to include
discrimination because of pregnancy, and it requires that pregnancy be
treated the same as any comparable physical condition under an employer's short-term disability plan.'"' The PDA thus protects women not
just from irrational discrimination based on pregnancy but also from
indifference to pregnancy's effect on their short-term ability to work.'"
The State of California went even further than the PDA, affirmatively mandating childbirth-related maternity leave, even for employees
who were not protected against any other short-term disabilities.9 0 The

182.
183.

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

540-41 (summarizing the State's argument about women and men having different
"tendencies" that require different pedagogical approaches).
See MichaelM., 450 U.S. at 471-73 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion).
See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 336 ("The employee's very womanhood would thus directly
undermine her capacity to provide [security]."). By conceding that the sex differences
relied upon in these more recent cases are more closely connected to biology than
those in Bradwell, I do not mean to imply that they are not also based on stereotypes
or gender hierarchy. See generally infa, part III.B.3; Law, supra note 175 at 1014
n.217 (citing Dothardand Rostker for the point, "There is substantial evidence that
the judiciary is not able to distinguish between biology and the social consequences
attached to it.").
417 U.S. 484 (1974).
Geduldig,417 U.S. at 496 n.20.
See Gen. Elec. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(k) (2006).
Id.
Cf Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (holding that mandatory
pregnancy leave for a teacher still able to work was impermissible).
See WEST's ANN. CALIF. Gov. CODE § 12945 (2005).
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Court upheld this statute in CaliforniaFederalSavings and Loan Association v. Guerra (CalFed),'9 ' in which an employer argued that the
California law constituted both sex discrimination and pregnancy discrimination. The employer pointed out that the maternity leave
requirement contradicted the PDA's insistence that pregnancy be treated
"the same as" other comparable conditions. 92 Looking to congressional
intent, the CalFedCourt read "the same as" to mean "no less favorably
than."l 93 The state was thus given a choice: it could seek substantively
equal outcomes in the face of natural difference, or it could allow natural differences to translate into unequal outcomes. This ability to choose
whether to try to ameliorate "natural" inequality is characteristic of contingent equal protection.
A common denominator of the real differences cases is that, regardless of whether the classification is challenged by a male or female party,
the justifying biology-susceptibility to pregnancy or rape-is constructed as the natural disadvantage of women.'94 Under the contingent
equal protection approach, the state can choose but has no duty to accommodate or make up for this natural disadvantage. In each case, the
state's treatment of gender was permissible but not required. The real
differences cases thus share the same analytical structure as other cases of
contingent equal protection, with the purportedly natural disadvantage
of biology playing the role of structural inequality.' First, differential
treatment by race or sex is justified by the Court's acceptance of the
claim that an inequality exists but is not the government's fault-that is,
that the inequality is not attributable to state action. Second, the state
may choose whether to ameliorate that inequality.

191. 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
192. CalFed,479 U.S. at 279.
193. CalFed, 479 U.S. at 285 ("Congress intended the PDA to be a 'floor beneath which
pregnancy disability benefits may not drop-not a ceiling above which they may not
rise.'") (quoting lower court decision).
194. As the prison context of Dothardv. Rawlinson should have helped make clear, vulnerability to rape is not a biologically determined sex characteristic. See Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1305-06
(1991) ("Men can be raped, and sometimes are. That alone should suggest that the
overwhelming numbers of women in the rape victim population expresses inequality,
not biology."). It is also not obvious that potential for pregnancy should be constructed as a vulnerability rather than as an ability. See inja, part III.B.2., for a
discussion of parental rights, the only area of law in which women's biology is understood to confer advantage relative to men.
195. On the relationship between biological difference and structural inequality, see Part
II.B.3, infia.
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2. A Not-So-Real Difference
The shared structure of contingent equal protection and real differences cases is also shown by how lawyers define the category of real
differences cases. Two cases involving the exclusion of women from
combat service in the military are routinely classified as real differences
cases.'" The difference-the combat exclusion-was clearly de jure.
What mattered, however, was that, like structural inequality or biological sex differences, the combat exclusion was unquestioned in the
context of the litigation. Because an admitted inequality was beyond the
Court's power to remedy, contingent equal protection gave the government the option to level the playing field or to leave it askew.
The military cases are the only modern real differences cases that
do not claim to rest strictly on biology. Rostker v. Goldberg upheld maleonly registration for the draft.197 Schlesinger v. Ballard upheld the navy's
policy of giving women extra time to achieve promotion under the upor-out policy.'" Both cases were premised on the unchallenged exclusion
of women from combat positions. In Rostker, women's exclusion from
combat was the purported reason for excluding them from registration
for the draft, since Congress believed a draft would most likely seek
combat troops.'99 In Ballard, exclusion from combat and sea duty limited women's ability to acquire the prerequisites for promotion; the navy
allowed them extra time to make up for its own discriminatory policy. 200
Rostker and Ballard are consistently classed with the real differences
cases, even though they are based not on biological differences but on
the military's explicit, sex-based exclusion of women from combat.201
Analytically, then, Rostker and Ballardshow that what makes a difference
"real" is that the law takes it as a given. No party in Ballard or Rostker

196. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498
(1975).

197. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).

198. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
199. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 76. The more likely reason for excluding women from registration, over the protest of military officers who testified in favor of registering
women, was the political desire to maintain an ideology that looks to the male military to protect the women and children at home.
200. See Ballard,419 U.S. at 508.
201. See, e.g., Law, supra note 175, at 962 (listing real differences cases). Although many
would surely argue that the combat exclusion itself was justified by biology, the
Court has not confronted that claim because the exclusion was unchallenged in both
cases. Moreover, biology has not changed in recent decades, but the combat exclusion
has nearly disappeared. The justifications for what remains have more to do with the
behavior of male troops than with women's abilities.
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challenged women's exclusion from combat.202 This failure made the fact
that women did not serve in combat, even though clearly a function of
law, just as "real" as the differences that the Court saw as imposed by
nature in cases like Michael M., Dothard, and Geduldig. A real difference
is simply one that the Court can not (or will not) order to be changed.203
This analytical structure unites the real differences cases with the
explicitly remedial cases involving social security, affirmative action, and
integration. In all of these cases, the Court's analysis takes some social
fact of inequality-structural inequality, biological sex differences, or the
combat exclusion-as a given for purposes of the litigation. Because that
social fact is treated as unproblematic under the Equal Protection
Clause, the state is under no duty to try to change it. But because that
social fact creates conditions of actual inequality, the state has a legitimate interest in change if it chooses to try.
Because the analytical structure is the same, the plurality view in
Parents Involved threatens not only remedial efforts that involve raceconscious state action but also those that involve sex classifications and
even sex-conscious social policy. For example, under Geduldig, the PDA
and the California maternity leave statute arguably do not contain sex
classifications. Because pregnancy is not a sex classification, special protection for pregnancy fails to trigger heightened review, just as the
targeted exclusion failed to trigger heightened review in Geduldig. However, both the PDA and the California law were adopted to give women
a relative advantage, as compared to a status quo in which disfavored
treatment of pregnancy was legal. Altering the playing field in women's
favor (or, more precisely, altering it to favor men to a lesser degree) was a
motivating factor for the legislation.
Similarly, the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 204 although
gender-neutral on its face, was enacted and even upheld by the Supreme
Court as an attempt to achieve greater substantive equality for women
in the workplace. 205 Although Congress could have enacted the FMLA
solely pursuant to its power to regulate interstate commerce, states

202. See Ballard,419 U.S. at 508 (noting that the plaintiff did not challenge the combat
and sea duty restrictions); Rostker, 453 U.S. at 83 (White, J., dissenting) ("I assume
what has not been challenged in this case-that excluding women from combat positions does not offend the Constitution."). Although the issue was not raised, the
majority in Rostker clearly would have upheld the combat exclusion.
203. Cf Spann, supra note 16, at 636-39 ("A baseline is something that separates the factors that a court actively considers from the factors whose validity a court assumes
without examination.").
204. 29 U.S.C. %§2601-54 (2006).
205. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
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would have been immune from damages suits by their employees.20 6 For
states to be liable under the FMLA, Congress had to act pursuant to its
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. 207 In Nevada Department
of Human Resources v. Hibbs, the Supreme Court held that Congress
could use the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the FMLA against the
states. 208 To reach this conclusion, the Court had to strain to identify a
pattern of state action unconstitutionally discriminating against female
employees that corresponded to the remedy provided by the FMLA. 209 A
more honest assessment of the FMLA is that its purpose was to alter the
playing field: to restructure employment markets to accommodate employees with caretaking responsibilities, in large part in order to achieve
greater substantive sex equality.
If eliminating defacto racial segregation is not a legitimate state interest, it is hard to see how the government would fare much better in
claiming an interest in restructuring employment markets to facilitate
greater achievement by a naturally less suited class of people (such as
women who have or plan to have or might accidentally have children).
A Supreme Court prepared to constitutionalize de facto racial segregation would not necessarily balk at doing the same for gender
hierarchy.210
To summarize, the real differences cases turn out to be a special case
of contingent equal protection in which the structural inequality appears
as the product of natural biology rather than human history. Understanding the shared doctrinal structure is important for two reasons.
First, any doctrinal shift toward the Parents Involved plurality view is
unlikely to be confined to the context of K-12 integration, an effort that
hardly needed the Supreme Court's help to join the ranks of the nation's
206. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 726 (explaining the states' sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment and the power of Congress to abrogate that immunity pursuant to Section 5 of Fourteenth Amendment).

207. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 726.
208. See 538 U.S. at 734-35.
209. See 538 U.S. at 728-32. While Congress certainly had evidence of sex discrimination,
including discrimination with respect to parental leave, the FMLA's affirmative requirements for family and medical leave go well beyond remedying anything that the
Supreme Court would have found to be unconstitutional sex discrimination. For further discussion of the relationship of contingent equal protection to Congress's
Section 5 power, see infra, Part III.B.1.
210. The main reason one might expect them to balk is non-doctrinal and is that white
male members of the Court may have greater empathy with, for example, the plight
of professional women. See Joan C. Williams, Hibbs as a Federalism Case, Hibbs as a
MaternalWall Case, 73 U. CINN. L. REv. 365, 374-75 (2004) (describing Chief Justice Rehnquist's experiences caring for his wife when she was ill and helping his
daughter, a lawyer and single mother, with child care).
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neglected aspirations.211 Despite the claimed importance of context in
equal protection analysis,212 doctrinal developments in one area eventually carry over into others.213 Second, understanding that the state
interest in racial equality plays the same analytical role as the state interests in Webster, CalFed, and Hibbs shows that rejecting equality as a
compelling state interest would be an abrupt departure from existing
law.
3. Real Differences as Structural Inequality
The analytical parallel between accommodating sex differences and
correcting structural inequality is unsurprising. The problem in real differences cases is not a problem of women's natural and inherent
disadvantage but a problem of structural features of society that are
premised on a male norm and on gender hierarchy. 214 Social mechanisms
reproduce that structure together with the reproduction of racial hierarchy. For example, existing demand for workers who are free of
caretaking responsibilities is premised on the social fact of gender hierarchy. The same is true of the pregnancy exclusion in Geduldig. Sex
difference is the material basis for women's subordination, so it is not
surprising that these "real" differences play the same role in contingent
equal protection as structural inequality. The problem that presents as
women's difference is in fact the social structure that makes that difference problematic.
At the same time, the apparent naturalness of sex differences can
give greater force to claims for substantive equality. The persistent effects
of structural racism are often dismissed as personal or cultural failures.
Although similar claims are also made about women's choices or propensities, it is hard to deny that, say, lack of pregnancy leave means that
women's economic opportunities are, on the whole, constrained in a
way that men's are not. The obviousness of this fact is illustrated by the
211. See Black, supra note 22, at 949 ("I am disheartened to admit now that desegregation
was effectively dying prior to the decision in ParentsInvolved.").
212. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003) ("Context matters when reviewing race-based governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause.").
213. See Mayeri, supra note 4; Karlan, Small Numbers, supra note 2, at 1387.
214. See MacKinnon, supra note 194, at 1305-06 ("Men can be raped, and sometimes are.
That alone should suggest that the overwhelming numbers of women in the rape victim population expresses inequality, not biology."); but see SUSAN BROWNMILLER,
AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 6 (1975) ("From the humblest beginnings of the social order based on a primitive system of retaliatory force . . . woman
was unequal before the law. By anatomical fiat ... the human male was a natural
predator and the human female served as his natural prey.").
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fact that Chief Justice Rehnquist-generally no friend to feminist
claims-wrote the sweeping opinion in Hibbs upholding the FMLA as a
matter of sex equality.21 5 The connection between claims of natural difference and structural inequality is even more obvious-and more likely
to draw the sympathy of the Supreme Court-in the rare instance, discussed in Part III, where the perceived natural disadvantage falls on
men.216 Thus, while one wing of the Supreme Court seeks to use race
cases to turn the Equal Protection Clause into a tool for entrenching
inequality,217 sex difference cases point to the possibility of an Equal Protection Clause that promotes and perhaps even requires not just facially
neutral treatment but affirmative equality. Part III outlines these two
possible futures for contingent equal protection.
III.

THE FUTURE OF CONTINGENT EQUAL PROTECTION

ParentsInvolved exposed a fault line in equal protection doctrine. In
affirmative action cases, the Court has loosely asserted that societal discrimination is not a compelling state interest.2 " The Parents Involved
plurality took that statement out of context and at face value. Fortunately, Justice Kennedy spun out the implications and distanced himself
from the plurality's project. The Court is thus narrowly divided over
whether the government can even try to alter the status quo of racial
hierarchy.
Government efforts to reduce both racial and gender inequality fall
under the analytic umbrella of contingent equal protection. Developments in one area will tend to affect the other. This Part explores
potential consequences, depending on which way the split revealed in
Parents Involved is resolved. Part III.A outlines the ramifications beyond
school integration of the plurality's willful blindness to structural inequality. Part III.B sketches some possibilities of the alternative path.
Beyond just preserving the basic contingent equal protection that most
people assumed was constitutional before Parents Involved, openly rec215. See Williams, supra note 210, at 374-75 ("Justice Rehnquist ... is not known as a
feminist. Yet he has had ample opportunity to experience first-hand various kinds of
family caretaking.").
216. See infra Part III.B.
217. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmry. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
725-33 (2007); Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681-83 (2009) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); see generally Bodensteiner, supra note 93; Hutchinson, supra note 93;
Haney L6pez, supra note 27; Freeman, supra note 93.
218. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (Powell, J.,
announcing judgment); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227
(1995); see also supra Part I.B.1.
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ognizing the state interest in equality would provide a structure for fur-

ther pro-equality efforts, as well as the seeds for modest legislative and
judicial protection of positive rights.
A. Constitutionalizingthe Status Quo:
The Path ofthe Parents Involved Plurality
The Parents Involved plurality would have held that racial
integration of K-12 public schools was not a compelling state interest
and was thus unconstitutional regardless of the means through which it
was pursued. Radical enough in its own right, this ruling would have
had far-reaching implications for both race and sex cases in the realm of
contingent equal protection.
1. Perpetuating Racial Hierarchy
The most immediate consequences of the plurality's view are laid
out in the record of ParentsInvolved. In the particular context of public
schools, the difference between Justice Kennedy and the plurality was
that Justice Kennedy would have allowed race-conscious measures to
promote integration without individual classification of students. The
consequences of the position ultimately taken by the plurality were
clearly exposed and explored during oral argument. At the K-12 level,
the plurality's approach would invalidate the entire spectrum of site selection, magnet, and voluntary transfer programs that schools have
developed to strive for racial integration in the post-Brown era. Higher
education admissions program of the kind proposed in Justice Thomas's
Grutter dissent would be similarly doomed.
Ironically, it was Justice Scalia who led the charge at oral argument
for distinguishing between a race-conscious state interest and racial classification of individuals.219 Justice Kennedy and the ultimate dissenters
asked whether it made sense to say that integration was an appropriate
goal but then prevent the state from using the most obvious means for
achieving it. 220 Echoing the debate in Grutter and Gratz over holistic
versus transparent evaluation, this argument overlooked the problematic
nature of racial classification itself. Justice Kennedy, it seems, was persuaded by Justice Scalia's arguments that the state interest could be
219. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 28-29, ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. 701 (No. 05908).
220. See id. at 20-21 (Ginsburg, J.), 22 (Kennedy, J.), 23 (Souter, J.).
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preserved but the classifications should be rejected. Justice Scalia himself
inexplicably joined the plurality's embrace of the plaintiffs' extreme position and gratuitously expanded on it in his Ricci concurrence. That
position would render unconstitutional all conscious efforts by state actors to achieve racially integrated schools. The only exception would be
when the state could establish the affirmative defense that it would have
taken the same action even if race had not been a factor.
As Justice Scalia's opinion in Ricci showed, this reasoning need not
stop with preventing the conscious integration of schools. In some ways,
the concept of integration can be distinguished from the concept of
equality. 22 1 Much of our nation's history can be understood as suggesting
that the two go together, but people of good faith debate whether and
when separation might be a better path to equality. At the level of the
Supreme Court's analysis, however, virtually any question of statedesired equality can be analogized to a question of integration. "Integration," meaning racial diversity in the schools, is not all that different
from integration or racial diversity in workplaces, particular professions,
representative bodies, or even economic classes. The Court has already
suggested that low minority participation in a particular profession
should be interpreted not as a symptom of persisting inequality but as a
reflection of cultural or ethnic preference.222 An expressed desire to improve the relative status of a particular racial group could easily become
grounds for striking down state action taken on that basis. The path of
the ParentsInvolved plurality could thus lead quite easily and predictably
to a racial version of Lochner, in which, in a final irony of the disparate
impact doctrine, any intentional governmental interference with the
racial status quo is deemed a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Some of this ground has already been scouted. Professor FordeMazrui's early insight into the potential vulnerability of race-neutral affirmative action has already been borne out by the Parents Involved
plurality opinion. Similarly, in 2003 Richard Primus described (but, like
Forde-Mazrui, did not advocate) how the Equal Protection Clause could

221. See supra note 132 (discussing the relationship between integration and equality).
222. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 501-02 (1989) (rejecting
the argument that a proportionately small number of government contracts awarded
to minority-owned firm was necessarily evidence of discrimination, and stating that
blacks may prefer other careers); Haney IUpez, supra note 27, at 1050 ("O'Connor
followed [ethnicity theory proponents] down the ethnic road and, however implausible the claim, confidently suggested that the virtual absence of blacks from one of the
few employment sectors where persons with relatively little formal education nevertheless earned a living wage actually reflected some perverse volition or cultural
maldisposition on their part.").
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be used to attack Title VII disparate impact rules. 223 Like race-neutral
affirmative action, the disparate impact rules could be deemed unconstitutional for taking race into account. Justice Scalia relied on Primus's
article for his Ricci concurrence,224 although he omitted Primus's conclusion that "only a very uncompromising court" would take
colorblindness that far. 22 5 A plurality appears to be willing. Moreover,
the Supreme Court will not be the first to consider such a challenge:
Opponents of affirmative action are already preparing to attack raceneutral alternative action in states that have banned "racial preferences"
226
by statute. If successful, such a case would be the first use of disparate
impact doctrine to strike down a facially neutral policy aimed at promoting equality, setting the stage for this new doctrinal twist to expand
to its logical limits, unless and until it is overhauled by the Supreme
227
Court.
2. Perpetuating Gender Hierarchy
Harder to predict is how the elimination of contingent equal protection for racial inequality would affect government efforts to promote
sex equality. One aim of this Article is to help forestall the retrenchment
of racial hierarchy implicit in the Parents Involved plurality opinion by
pointing out the logical implications not just for race but also for gender. Although they could be distinguished on the basis of the differing
standards of review, that distinction is not warranted on the question of
whether equality is a legitimate state interest. Once the racial status quo
becomes constitutionalized, there is little to stop the same from happening with gender.

223. See Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117
HARv. L. REV. 293 (2003).

224. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).
225. Primus, supra note 223, at 585.
226. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 63 (advocating state constitutional challenges to raceneutral affirmative action at universities in Michigan and Texas); but see Goodman,
supra note 63 (arguing that such challenges should fail).
227. For a discussion of those logical limits, see Crenshaw, supra note 92, at 126 ("They
should not be surprised to find challenges to ethnic and women's studies programs,
identity-based student organizations, ethnic alumni associations, outreach and noticing requirements, and even breast cancer screenings and domestic violence shelters as
forms of preference."). For an initial confirmation of these predictions, see Corey
Kilgannon, Lawyer FilesAntifeminist Suit Against Columbia, N.Y. TIMES CITY Room,
lawyer-filesAug. 18, 2008, http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/08/18/
antifeminist-suit-against-columbial (reporting the filing of a lawsuit charging Columbia University with sex discrimination for having a women's studies program).
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For example, the Supreme Court could well find itself persuaded
that Geduldig was wrong, and that a pregnancy classification is, after all,
a sex classification. That would mean that pure pregnancy discrimination-e.g., firing an employee who becomes pregnant-would be
unconstitutional when practiced by a state employer. But it would also
provide a constitutional basis for overruling CalFed. The Court has already co-opted a liberal rhetoric of colorblindness to oppose affirmative
action.22 8 Co-opting liberal arguments that sex classifications should receive nearly-strict scrutiny and that Geduldeg was wrongly decided, a
Court following the logic of the Parents Involved plurality could easily
strike down California's maternity leave statute as wrongly conferring
special rights. 22 1
Even if well-established precedent and practices were preserved,
cutting back on contingent equal protection could prevent the flourishing of more recent efforts toward substantive equality. For example,
recent medical emphasis on the importance of breastfeeding has led to a
wave of disputes over whether employers should allow breaks for women
to express milk, or whether childbirth-related leave should be extended
when there is difficulty establishing milk flow. Federal courts generally
have been hostile to employees who pursue such questions under Title
VII and the PDA. For example, in a passage reminiscent of Geduldig's
distinction between "pregnant women and nonpregnant persons," one
federal court held that a breastfeeding woman was not "affected by
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions" as required by the
PDA. 230 The court therefore granted a motion to dismiss her claim that
she was denied breaks to express milk while others were allowed to take
similar breaks to smoke.2 3 1 In other words, there was no entitlement to
judicial intervention to level the playing field along this particular axis.

228. See Pamela S. Karlan, What Can Brown(R) Do For You? Neutral Principles and the
Struggle Over the Equal Protection Clause, 58 DumE L.J. 1049, 1063-66 (2009) (analyzing the Parents Involved Court's mis-use of Brown).

229. Cf Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 637 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
anti-discrimination laws constitute "special rights").
230. See Puente v. Ridge, No. Civ.A. M-04-267, 2005 WL 1653017, at *4 (S.D. Tex. July
6, 2005). For an interesting analysis of the federal courts' hostility to the PDA and
adherence to the logic of Geduldig, see Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the
Separation of Powers: Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 511, 553-56 (2009).

231. See Puente, 2005 WL 1653017, at *4; see also Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., No. 906259, 1991 WL 270823 (6th Cir. Dec. 19, 1991) (holding that breastfeeding is not a
medical condition related to pregnancy, even where an infant refused bottles); Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 927, 931 (4th Cir. 1988) (rejecting a disparate impact
challenge to a denial of discretionary leave for breastfeeding); Fejes v. Gilpin Ven-
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Non-judicial actors in several states have taken the opposite view.
Recently enacted laws in Oregon, Illinois, Minnesota, and Tennessee
require employers to accommodate breastfeeding where reasonably possible.2 32 Some state agencies have moved toward the position that failure
to reasonably accommodate breastfeeding is sex discrimination under
state law.
The breastfeeding dispute is thus shaping up to be a reprise of
Geduldig and the PDA, with the federal courts taking a narrow view of
equality and everyone else taking a broader view. Contingent equal protection would allow the states to enact that broader view in order to
promote substantive equality for women. Without equality as a legitimate, important state interest, however, laws for accommodating
breastfeeding are, like race-neutral affirmative action, vulnerable under
disparate impact doctrine.
Some remedies for sex discrimination might be justified by state interests other than equality. For example, accommodation of
breastfeeding might be justified as a health measure. However, human
rights advocates have increasingly recognized the importance of seeking
substantive sex equality through measures designed to improve the
status of "women who encounter multiple forms of discrimination,"
234
including race discrimination. Under current doctrine, a policy that
took both race and sex into account would be analyzed twice: once as a
sex classification, once as a race classification. Because the level of scrutiny is higher for race classifications, that standard would effectively
control. Measures aimed at improving the worst instances of structural
inequality would thus be among the most vulnerable to constitutional
attack.
tures, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1487 (D. Colo. 1997) (holding that "medical conditions"

pertains only to the mother and that breastfeeding is a child-rearing concern).
232. 820 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 260/10; MINN. STAT. § 181.939; ORE. REv. STAT. § 653.077;
TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-305 (1999). See also GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-6 (Supp.
2005) 34-1-6 (2004) (authorizing employer accommodation of breastfeeding and

stating that an employer "is not required to provide break time under this Code section if to do so would unduly disrupt the operations of the employer"); R.I. GEN.
LAws § 23-13.2-1(a) (same as Georgia); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 132:10-d ("Breastfeeding a child does not constitute an act of indecent exposure and to restrict or limit
the right of a mother to breast-feed her child is discriminatory.").
233. See, e.g., Mont. Dep't. of Labor & Indus., Human Rights Bureau, Employment Discrimination is Against the Law (advising employers to accommodate breast-feeding)
(on file with author).
234. International Women's Rights Action Watch Asia Pacific, Addressing Intersectional
Discrimination with Temporary Special Measures, 8 INT'L WOMEN'S RIGHTS ACTION
WATCH ASIA PACIFIc OCCASIONAL PAPERS SERIES 1, 5 (2006), available at http://
www.iwraw-ap.org/aboutus/pdf/OPSVIII.pf; see generally Kimberld Crenshaw, Demarginalizingthe Intersection ofRace and Sex, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139.

446

MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER

&

LAW

[Vol. 16:397

B. ContingentEqualProtection and the Seeds ofPositive Equality
In the hope that the Parents Involved plurality will not become a
majority, this section considers the possibility of a path in the opposite
direction. A standard critique of the Supreme Court's equal protection
jurisprudence is that its disparate impact and real differences cases reflect
willful blindness to serious race and gender subordination,235 from Washington v. Davis to McKleskey v. Kemp,2 36 and from Feeney to Geduldig.
The concept of contingent equal protection gives a name and structure
to the small silver lining, that at least the Court has left some space for
benign state action against race and gender subordination. Explicit recognition of the state interest in equality would assure the
constitutionality of state efforts to eliminate structural inequality. It
would also provide an opportunity to revisit the scope of federal power
to promote equality under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Finally, contingent equal protection could provide a basis for establishing a governmental obligation to overcome existing inequality in at least
some contexts.
1. Implications for Legislative Power
State legislatures have plenary police power and may enact laws to
promote equality as long as equality is a legitimate state interest. Congress, however, must act pursuant to an enumerated power. Explicit
recognition of a state interest in equality would raise the question
whether Congress may enact legislation on that same basis.
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment confers on Congress the
power to enforce the Amendment, including the Equal Protection
Clause. Although the framers expected Section 5 to be the primary
means of enforcement, Congress's power went largely unused while the
Supreme Court took over the task of interpreting and enforcing the
Fourteenth Amendment.2 37 Congress later relied on its power over inter235. See Michael Boucci, Caught In a Web ofIgnorances: How Black Americans Are Denied
EqualProtectionofthe Laws, 18 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 239, 262 (2004-05) ("McCleskey v.
Kemp may be the paradigmatic case where the Court's purported inability to know
reaches nearly unbelievable proportions."); id at 250-51 (discussing the same aspect

of Washington v. Davis).
236. 481 U.S. 279 (1986) (rejecting a petitioner's claim of race discrimination in the administration of the death penalty).
237. See Steven Engel, Note, The McCulloch Theory ofthe Fourteenth Amendment: City of

Boerne v. Flores and the Original Understandingof Section 5, 109 YALE L.J. 115, 123
(1999).
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state commerce to enact civil rights legislation. 238 Recently, however, the
Court decided that civil rights laws could not be fully enforced against
the states if they were based solely on the commerce power. Congress
needed Section 5.239
At the same time, the Supreme Court began to construe the Section 5 power narrowly. In most cases, it demanded that Congress limit
its efforts to combating unequal treatment that was illegal under the
Court's own precedents. As the Court saw it, anything else was unauthorized expansion of the Equal Protection Clause. On this basis, the
Court struck down the civil rights remedy of the Violence Against
Women Act and limited the scope of the Americans with Disabilities
Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.240
One notable aberration in this line of cases is the Court's decision
to
to uphold the FMLA. 2 1' As discussed above, that decision is hard
242
Ansquare with the Court's other pronouncements about Section 5.
other aberration is disparate impact doctrine. Arguably, these two
aberrations suggest that the Court is willing to allow Congress greater
leeway when it uses Section 5 to redress discrimination on the basis of
suspect characteristics, like race and sex. 243 That would explain the contrast between the Court's deference to the FMLA and Title VII and its
lack of deference to the ADA and ADEA. Justice Scalia's Ricci concurrence, by contrast, positions the Equal Protection Clause itself as directly
opposed to Congress's power to reduce structural inequality.
Criticisms of the Court's recent Section 5 jurisprudence are many.
For purposes of this Article it is sufficient to note that the concept of
contingent equal protection provides a foundation for expanding Section 5 powers without letting them run rampant in the style of the
commerce power. The same interest in structural inequality that justifies
race- or sex-conscious legislation by states could also mark the scope of
238. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding Title II
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a valid exercise of the commerce power).
239. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that pre-Civil
War enumerated powers, in this case the Indian Commerce Clause, cannot abrogate
state sovereign immunity).
240. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down the civil rights
remedy of the Violence Against Women Act); see also Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that Section 5 does not include the
power to outlaw disability discrimination in state employment); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that Section 5 does not include the power to
outlaw age discrimination in state employment).
241. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
242. See supra notes 205-209 and accompanying text (discussing the implausibility of the
reasoning in Nevada v. Hibbs).
243. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735-36.
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Congress's Section 5 power.244 This would give Congress the same authority as states to seek substantive equality in the face of de facto
inequality and sex differences.
2. The Road Less Travelled: Positive Protection of
Equal Access to Fundamental Rights
In all of the contexts discussed so far, contingent equal protection
has been characterized by government choice, rather than obligation, to
redress inequality. That choice ultimately derives from the state action
doctrine. The state action doctrine makes the government accountable
only for harms linked through a tight chain of causation to specific, illegal acts of discrimination by the government. Everything else is societal
discrimination or structural inequality. When the purportedly natural
workings of society result in inequality, the government may choose
whether to act as a counter-weight. The difficulty of establishing an affirmative right to government help is that government is not required to
act without proof of fault and causation. Equal protection is a restraint,
not a prod.
In one context, however, the Supreme Court has restrained the
government in a way that requires accommodation of biological inequality. The "real differences" cases discussed above included sexual
vulnerability, work and family, and military combat, all of which put
women at a disadvantage relative to men. In a series of cases about the
parental rights of unwed fathers, however, the Court for the first and
only time requiredaccommodation of a biological difference, rather than
leaving the matter to legislative discretion.24 5
The unwed father cases involved a series of challenges to state laws
that treated the mother but not the father as the legal parent of a child
born outside of marriage.246 The Court started with the assumption that
the biological mother's parental rights were established by the birth of

244. This approach would be consistent with most of the outcomes in the Section 5 cases
since Boerne, including the distinction between race and sex cases-where Congress's
power appears to be broader-and cases involving other characteristics, such as age or
disability-where Congress's power appears to be narrower. The interest in eliminating structural inequality would, however, provide a sounder basis for Hibbs than what
the Court offered in its opinion.
245. For a more detailed argument on this point, see Hendricks, Essentiallya Mother, supra
note 154, at 433-50.
246. The main cases are Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed,
441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).

2010]

CONTINGENT EQUAL PROTECTION

449

the child.247 The Court also accepted the state's argument that biological
fathers were not similarly situated to biological mothers: biological maternity implied a caretaking relationship to the child, which is not part
of biological paternity. 24 8 Men were thus at a biological disadvantage
when it came to parental rights.249 By analogy to cases such as Geduldig,
where women were biologically disadvantaged in the workplace, the
conclusion should have been that the state could choose whether to accommodate men's disadvantage by giving them parental rights.
The Court, however, did not end its analysis with the observation
that women and men are not similarly situated and therefore need not
be treated the same. Instead, having identified a relevant biological difference between the sexes, the Court took another step: it used
motherhood as the model for crafting a "biology-plus-relationship" test
to accommodate fathers' physical disadvantage. As the Court later explained, it makes sense to allow a man to acquire parental rights
comparable to a mother's by creating a test "in terms the male can fulfill." 25 0 Men's biological disadvantage thus served not as a justification
for different legal treatment but as the impetus for devising a legal standard that fairly accommodated their disadvantage. Parental rights, the
one area of law in which men's biology rather than women's is a disadvantage, is also the one area in which the Supreme Court has adopted a
flexible, accommodating theory of sex equality as a matter of constitutional command, not just governmental choice.
The fathers' rights cases, understood in the broader context of contingent equal protection, provide a basis for finding some affirmative
rights to accommodation and substantive equality in the Equal Protection Clause. Constitutional lawyers and theorists have tried many
247. See Hendricks, Essentiallya Mother, supra note 154, at 435-36.
248. See id.
249. Men are disadvantaged by their inability to become pregnant and give birth to a
child. Cf Marjorie Maguire Schultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 297, 303 (1990)
(noting the "disadvantage men experience in accessing child-nurturing opportunities").
250. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 67 (2001) (describing Congress's effort to give male
citizens the means to obtain citizenship for foreign-born children). See also Mary L.
Shanley, Unwed Fathers' Rights, Adoption, and Sex Equality: Gender Neutrality and the
Perpetuation of Patriarchy,95 COLUM. L. REv. 60, 88-90 (1995) (stating that the
model parent is a pregnant woman but that "different biological roles of men and
women in human reproduction make it imperative that law and public policy 'recognize that a father and a mother must be permitted to demonstrate commitment to
their child in different ways'") (quoting Recent Developments: Family Law-Unwed
Fathers' Rights-New York Court of Appeals Mandates Veto Power Over Newborn's
Adoption for Unwed Father Who Demonstrates Parental Responsibility, 104 HARv. L.

REv. 800, 807 (1991)).
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strategies over time to find affirmative human rights in our Constitution: subsistence, equality, health care. These efforts have floundered on
the libertarian and property-protective nature of the Constitution. Contingent equal protection does not provide a way around that roadblock.
It does, however, shine light on the tension in the Supreme Court's
dominant narrative of negative equality, and the light reveals a few
cracks.
One such crack is the equality rhetoric about abortion. Although
the abortion right is formally deemed a matter of liberty under the Due
Process Clause, many commentators and even the Court have suggested
that the right has an equality component as well. 25' A possible problem
with such arguments is that they assume a governmental duty to accommodate de facto inequality. For example, some have argued that
women have a right to abortion because women are disproportionately
and discriminatorily saddled with responsibility for rearing children.2 52
That discrimination, however, is not attributable to the government under the state action doctrine. As we have seen, the existing inequality in
biology and in social circumstances typically means that the government
may choose whether to level the playing field by, say, giving women access to abortion.
The fathers' rights cases, however, suggest a different approach. The
abortion right is closely related to the right at stake in those cases, since
it involves the parent-child relationship as well as bodily integrity.2 53 In
the fatherhood cases, the state was required to accommodate biological
sex inequality when it acted to deny putative fathers of their liberty interest in the parent-child relationship. When the state restricts abortion,
it also denies a liberty interest, and might similarly be required to accommodate defacto inequality. 254

251. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992)
("The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the
Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives."); Reva
B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical Basis and
Evolving ConstitutionalExpression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815 (2007) (canvassing the literature on this issue).
252. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and OriginalMeaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291,
323-24 (2007) (arguing that abortion bans force women to become mothers, which
society links to disproportionate burdens with respect to child care).
253. Cf Julia E. Hanigsberg, Homologizing Pregnancy and Motherhood, 94 MICH. L. REV.
371, 372 (1995) ("suggesting a connection between motherhood and abortion").
254. I explore another aspect of this argument in Body and Soul: Equaliy, Pregnancy, and
the Unitary Right to Abortion, 45 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. (forthcoming 2010).
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CONCLUSION

Contingent equal protection has been implicit in several of the Supreme Court's decisions upholding remedial programs. It also underlay
the assumption that race-neutral affirmative action was available when
the courts restricted traditional programs. That consistent acknowledgement that the state has a compelling interest in equality should not
be overshadowed by the Court's dismissal of "societal discrimination" as
a basis for certain kinds of state action. The Court should explicitly recognize that both state and federal governments are empowered to strive
for the elimination of structural inequalities. Doing so would produce a
more consistent and appropriate relationship among the Equal Protection Clause, disparate impact doctrine, and Section 5. It may also
provide a foundation for modest development of affirmative governmental obligation to redress inequality. t

